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Transnational Dealings -- Morrison Continues to Make Waves
Marc I. Steinberg * and Kelly Flanagan**

Abstract
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. drastically altered the landscape
for transnational securities litigation and the way that courts determine proper
application of a statute concerning a transnational claim. The Supreme Court’s
characterization of extraterritoriality under the Securities Exchange Act as a
merits-based inquiry has led to a reexamination of limitations under other federal
statutes that were previously thought to be jurisdictional issues. Significantly,
Morrison created a roadmap for courts to follow when the extraterritoriality of a
statute is brought into question. The key to proper application of a statute is to
decipher the minimum U.S. contacts required to state a transnational claim. The
tests developed addressing this inquiry are critical in discerning the boundaries of
U.S. law at a time when transnational dealings are prevalent.

*

Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law and Senior Associate Dean for Research, SMU
Dedman School of Law.
**
Associate Counsel, Texas Association of REALTORS®.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,1
significantly altered the treatment of transnational securities claims. This article
explores Morrison’s impact, including trends that may emerge and questions that
remain.

The article commences with an analysis of this important decision.

Thereafter,

the

widespread

implications

of

Morrison’s

merits-based

characterization are addressed. The article then considers how Morrison affects
extraterritorial claims under other federal laws. Lastly, there is a detailed analysis
of the types of securities claims that endure after Morrison. The article’s focus is
that Morrison will have longstanding effects on both U.S. federal securities and
non-securities law.
II.

Making Waves – Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
A.

Pre-Morrison – The Calm Before the Storm

Understanding the background of Section 10(b), which is the principal
antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, and its application to
transnational securities fraud sets the stage for Morrison. Prior to Morrison, lower

1

130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
2
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federal courts held that Section 10(b) was silent as to extraterritorial application.2
When transactions with an international connection arose, courts considered
whether there was subject matter jurisdiction under Section 10(b) to adjudicate the
claim. 3 In determining extraterritorial applicability, lower federal courts focused on
policy matters such as the possible creation of a U.S. haven for those defrauding
foreign investors and Congress’s intent to establish a high standard of conduct in
securities transactions. 4 Also significant, the Second Circuit attempted to discern,

2

See, e.g., In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009); Morrison v.

Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008); Robinson v. TCI/US West Commc’ns
Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997).
3

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). See, e.g., In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d at 1312-13; Morrison,

547 F.3d at 176; Robinson, 117 F.3d at 904; Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Cont’l Grain (Austr.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 413-14 (8th
Cir. 1979).
4

See, e.g., MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing

the policy considerations of the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits where acts within the United
States have affected foreign investors).
3
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based on Section 10(b)’s underlying purposes, 5 whether Congress desired to
invoke the resources of U.S. courts in the transnational context. 6
With these considerations in mind, federal appellate courts, most notably the
Second Circuit, developed what became known as the “conduct” and “effects”
test.7 The conduct analysis inquired “whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the
5

The underlying purpose of Section 10(b) was to “remedy deceptive and manipulative conduct

with the potential to harm the public interest or the interests of investors.” Morrison, 547 F.3d at
170 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1838, at 32-33 (1934)).
6

Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170 (referring to Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d

Cir. 1975)).
7

See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1972)

(creating the conduct test); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir 1968)
(creating the effects test). For the purposes of this article, the pre-Morrison approach will be
referred to as the “conduct and effects test.” However, it should be noted that not all courts
performed a joint assessment of conduct and effects. Compare Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54
F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a combination of the “conduct test” and “effects test”
provides a better sense of whether sufficient U.S. contacts exist for a Section 10(b) claim) and
Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 n.8 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that a
comprehensive approach does a better job of measuring U.S. contacts), with Robinson, 117 F.3d
at 905 (explaining that either the conduct test or the effects test may “independently establish
jurisdiction”) and Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30 (offering the conduct and effects analyses as two
instances where jurisdiction may be exercised over securities transactions that were not
4

United States.” 8 The analysis applied to investors harmed abroad and varied
depending on whether the investor was an American or a foreigner. 9 When U.S.
investors suffered losses abroad, the Second Circuit required that materially
important acts performed in the United States “significantly contributed” to the
harm. 10 When foreigners suffered losses abroad, however, the acts occurring in the
United States must have “directly caused” the harm. 11 In the latter instance, acts in

consummated in the United States). For a comparison of the regulatory systems in place in the
world’s major markets, see Marc I. Steinberg and Lee Michaels, Disclosure in Global Offerings:
Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 207
(1999).
8

See In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009); Morrison, 547 F.3d

at 170.
9

Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.

10

Id. For instance, in Bersch v. Drexal Firestone, Inc., the court concluded that jurisdiction

existed where a prospectus emanating from the United States led to a fraudulent offering to U.S.
investors abroad. Id. at 992.
11

Id. See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding

direct causation where the alleged fraud was completed through trades on U.S. commodities
exchanges).
5

the United States that were “merely preparatory” did not satisfy the conduct test. 12
The Fifth,13 Seventh, 14 and D.C. Circuits15 adhered to the Second Circuit’s
approach, while the Third, 16 Eighth, 17 and Ninth 18 Circuits embraced more relaxed
standards.

12

Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992 (“While merely preparatory activities in the United States are not

enough to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they
are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident.”).
13

Robinson v. TCI/West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997) (referring to

the presumption against extraterritoriality and stating that policy arguments may provide reason
for Congress, but not the courts, to expand federal jurisdiction).
14

Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Second

Circuit test provides an appropriate balance between the caution that should be exercised in
finding extraterritorial application and the concern that the United States is not used as a base for
fraudulent operations).
15

Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (considering the

presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction and the “preserv[ation] of American judicial
resources for adjudication of domestic disputes and enforcement of domestic law”).
16

SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (asking whether “at least some activity

designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country”).
17

Cont’l Grain (Austr.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979)

(inquiring whether “defendants' conduct in the United States was in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme and was significant with respect to its accomplishment”).
6

The effects analysis, on the other hand, asked “whether the wrongful
conduct had a substantial effect in the United States.”19

The Second Circuit

created the effects test based on the belief that Congress intended to protect U.S.
investors who acquired foreign securities in the U.S. markets and to protect U.S.
markets from improper foreign conduct impacting U.S. securities. 20 For instance,
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 21 a case involving securities of a Canadian
corporation, the Second Circuit exercised jurisdiction where the transactions at
issue had occurred in Canada but impacted the value of common shares trading on

18

Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting the Eighth Circuit’s

test in Continental Grain).
19

Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). See also Robinson v.

TCI/West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30. The
Seventh and Eighth Circuits considered whether the effects were foreseeable and substantial. See
Kauthar SDN BHD, 149 F.3d at 665; Cont’l Grain (Austr.) Pty. Ltd., 592 F.2d at 416-17.
20

Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (rejecting the district court’s

conclusion that the Exchange Act did not apply to transactions outside of the territorial United
States).
21

405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
7

a U.S. exchange.22 The court asserted that application of Section 10(b) was
“necessary to protect American investors.” 23
For over forty years, the conduct and effects test was applied and refined by
the lower federal courts.24 Not surprisingly, some commentators criticized the
unpredictable and inconsistent application of Section 10(b) under the test. 25 In
2010, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court altered the
course of federal securities law concerning transnational securities fraud.26
B.

22

The Storm Strikes – The Morrison Decision

Id. at 208-09 (explaining that fraud upon the foreign corporation reduced its equity and

resulted in decreased stock value on U.S. exchanges).
23

Id. at 206.

24

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879-80 (detailing the history of the conduct and effects test).

25

See, e.g., Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the

Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1075 (2010);
Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities ClassAction Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 567-68 (2009); Kun Young Chuang, Multinational
Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of
Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 102 (2003);
Margaret Sachs, The International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L . 677 (1990).
26

130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
8

Morrison was a “foreign-cubed” case, or rather – a case where foreign
investors sued a foreign issuer under the U.S. securities laws for securities
transactions on a foreign exchange. 27 In 1998, National Australia Bank Ltd.
(National Australia) purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a Floridabased mortgage servicing company that received fees for collecting mortgage
payments. Since Homeside would not receive fees once a mortgage was fully paid,
the value of HomeSide’s right to receive such fees diminished as mortgages were
paid off early. Three years later, National Australia had to write down the value of
Homeside’s assets by $1.2 billion. National Australia explained that it had not
anticipated the lowering interest rates and related refinancings. The prices of
National Australia’s ordinary shares (which were listed on the Australian Stock
Exchange Limited (ASX)) and its American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)28 (which
27

Id. at 2894 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

28

As stated by the Third Circuit:
An ADR is a receipt that is issued by a depositary bank that represents a specified
amount of a foreign security that has been deposited with a foreign branch or agent of the
depositary, known as the custodian. The holder of an ADR is not the title owner of the
underlying shares; the title owner of the underlying shares is either the depositary, the
custodian, or their agent. ADRs are tradeable in the same manner as any other registered
American security, may be listed on any of the major exchanges in the United States or
traded over the counter, and are subject to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. This
9

were listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)) subsequently fell.
Australian and American investors then sued National Australia, HomeSide, and
their insiders, alleging violations of Section 10(b).29 The plaintiffs claimed that the
HomeSide defendants had manipulated the rates of early repayment as
“unrealistically low” with the objective of inflating the ostensible value of the
mortgage-servicing rights and that the National Australia defendants were aware of
this deception. 30
The district court dismissed the claims by the American investor in National
Australia’s ADRs for failure to allege damages. 31 Since the American investor did

makes trading an ADR simpler and more secure for American investors than trading in
the underlying security in the foreign market.
Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2005).
By purchasing ADRs, a U.S. investor can gain ownership in the shares of a foreign
company without the cross-border and currency inconveniences that the investor would
encounter if he instead purchased the shares on a foreign exchange. See generally Joseph Velli,
American Depositary Receipts: An Overview, Symposium: Entering the U.S. Securities Markets:
Opportunities and Risks for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S38, S39 (1994).
29

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.

30

Id.

31

In re Nat’l Austr. Bank Secs. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537 (BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *8-9

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
10

not appeal, only claims by the Australian investors in National Australia’s ordinary
shares traded on the ASX were further considered. 32 The district court then granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that
the acts in the United States were, “at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall
securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad.” 33 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, stating that the domestic acts did not “compris[e] the
heart of the alleged fraud.” 34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 35
As a threshold matter, the Court held that the extraterritorial reach of Section
10(b) with regard to National Australia’s conduct was a “merits” question under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6), not a subject-matter jurisdiction
question under FRCP Rule 12(b)(1).36 This “merits”-based approach constitutes a
radical departure from the subject matter jurisdictional rationale that had been
overwhelmingly embraced by the lower federal courts.37 Perhaps equally as
32

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876 n.1.

33

In re Nat’l Austr. Bank Secs. Litig., 2006 WL 3844465, at *8.

34

Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175-77 (2d Cir. 2008).

35

Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 783 (2009) (mem. op.).

36

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876-77.

37

See Jared L. Kopel et al., 42nd Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: Current Topics on

Securities Litigation, 1850 PLI/CORP 365, 391 (New York City, N.Y.) (Nov. 10-12, 2010)
(“[T]he Court swiftly swept away a half-century of lower courts treating the issue of
11

significant, the Supreme Court rejected the conduct and effects test. 38
In determining whether the plaintiffs had stated a claim, the Supreme Court
emphasized that unless Congress clearly expresses its affirmative intention “to give
a statute extraterritorial effect,” then the statute has no such application. 39 The
Court asserted that lower courts had disregarded this presumption against
extraterritoriality by creating the conduct and effects test to “discern” whether
Congress would have wanted a statute to apply. 40 The Court explained the
difficulties of applying the conduct and effects test, such as having to decipher the
degree of activity that transpired in the United States.41 After criticizing the
unpredictable application of Section 10(b) to transnational cases under the conduct

extraterritorial reach of the securities law as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.”). See, e.g.,
Morrison, 547 F.3d at 171; Robinson v. TCI/West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th
Cir. 1997); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998). For further
discussion, see infra notes 65-109 and accompanying text.
38

130 S. Ct. at 2877-83.

39

Id. at 2877 (commenting that various courts had been using this approach for decades).

40

Id. at 2878.

41

Id. at 2879. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986-87 (2d Cir. 1975)

(distinguishing between U.S. and foreign investors); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 101718 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that “mere preparatory activities” do not warrant extraterritorial
application).
12

and effects test, the Court reasoned that applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality in all cases provides stability moving forward.42
Next, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had legislated that
Section 10(b) applies abroad. 43 The Court held that the “general reference to
foreign commerce in the definition of ‘interstate commerce’ does not defeat the
presumption against extraterritoriality.” 44 Congress’s observations, when setting
forth the purposes of the Exchange Act, that “transactions in securities as
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected
with a national public interest” and that the “prices established in such transactions
are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign
countries” also failed to overcome the presumption. 45 Lastly, the Solicitor General
argued that Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act (which specifically authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate regulations having
42

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880-81 (criticizing “judicial-speculation-made-law-divining”); id.

at 2887 (specifically disapproving Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), from
which the Second Circuit developed its conduct and effects test).
43

See Id. at 2881-83.

44

Id. at 2882 (discussing the definition of “interstate commerce” in the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 78c(a)(17)).
45

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b).
13

extraterritorial application in order “to prevent . . . evasion of the Exchange Act”)
is evidence that the whole Exchange Act applies extraterritorially. 46 Disagreeing,
the Court concluded that Section 30(b) appeared to be “directed at actions abroad
that might conceal a domestic violation.”47
As an example of “a clear statement of extraterritorial effect,” the Court
focused on Section 30(a) of the Exchange Act. 48 That statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . to make use of the
mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for
the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction in any security the
issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or
has its principal place of business in, a place within or subject to the

46

Id. (contending that “[this] exemption would have no function if the Act did not apply in the

first instance to securities transactions that occur abroad” (Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae 14)).
47

Id. at 2882-83.

48

Id. at 2883. The Court remarked that this provision providing for “a specific extraterritorial

application would be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to
transactions on foreign exchanges. . . .” Id.
14

jurisdiction of the United States, in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . . 49
The Court noted that even where a statute, such as Section 30(a), has some
extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality “operates to
limit that provision to its terms.” 50 The Court concluded that there was not a
sufficient basis to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality for Section
10(b).51
Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b)
was immaterial in this instance, as they only sought domestic application
concerning the alleged financial manipulations and public statements of HomeSide
that occurred in Florida. 52 In response, the Court commented:
For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks
all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed

49

15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2011).

50

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.

51

Id. (“In short, there is no affirmative indication in the [Exchange Act] that § 10(b) applies

extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.”).
52

Id. at 2883-84.
15

if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is
involved in the case.53
The Court thus reasoned that the Exchange Act focuses on purchases and
sales of securities in the United States, not on the location where the deception
occurs.54 If indeed Congress had intended for the Exchange Act to apply to
conduct affecting transactions consummated abroad, the Court stated that it would
have addressed the subject of prospective conflicts with foreign laws and
procedures.55
The Court thereupon enunciated the “transactional test” for the invocation of
Section 10(b).56 Under this test, for Section 10(b) to apply, “the purchase or sale
[must be] made in the United States, or [must] involve[] a security listed on a
domestic exchange.” 57 Since the plaintiffs in Morrison did not purchase or sell
53

Id. at 2884 (emphasis in the original).

54

Id. (applying the same mode of analysis used in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499

U.S. 244 (1991)).
55

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.

56

Id. at 2886 (describing the test as a “clear test” that would not interfere with foreign securities

regulation).
57

Id. The Court explained that the prologue of the Exchange Act supported the significance of

the domestic exchange with its goal of “provid[ing] for the regulation of securities exchanges.”
Id. at 2884. Moreover, the Court stated that it knew of no one who thought the Exchange Act
16

securities listed on a domestic exchange (and because the transactions at issue did
was meant to regulate foreign exchanges. Id. As for domestic purchases and sales, the Court
referred back to Section 30(a) and (b), noting that, in each instance, the foreign location of the
transaction “establishes (or reflects the presumption of) the Act’s inapplicability, absent
regulations by the Commission.” Id. at 2885. The Court rejected the Solicitor General’s
suggested test, which would have provided Section 10(b) coverage when the “fraud involves
significant conduct in the United States,” primarily because the test lacked textual support. Id. at
2886. The Solicitor General stated that this test would “prevent[] the United States from
becoming a ‘Barbary Coast’ for malefactors perpetrating frauds in foreign markets.” Id. In
response, the Court stated that there is no evidence that the United States was on this path,
though “some fear that [the United States] has become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation
for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets.” Id.
Note that in certain circumstances, the SEC may be able to institute suit under Section
17(a) of the Securities Act when there are illegal offers to sell in the United States. Because
Section 17(a) extends to both offers and sales, a domestic offer (even when the transaction is
consummated abroad) comes within Section 17(a)’s coverage. See SEC v. Goldman Sachs &
Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Significantly, Section 17(a) is solely a
government enforcement tool. There is no private right of action under that statute. See, e.g.,
Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F. 2d 169 (2d Cir. 1992); Sears v. Likens, 912 F. 2d 889 (7th Cir.
1990); Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F. 2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982). For analyses of Section
17 (a), see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979);
Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act After Naftalin and Redington, 68 Geo. L.J.
163 (1979).
17

not otherwise occur in the United States), the Court concluded that the plaintiffs
had failed to state a claim and accordingly affirmed dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6).58

58

130 S. Ct. at 2888. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment

only. See generally id. at 2888-95 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens stated
that the judge-made rules in U.S. securities law were invited by Congress when it deliberately
created, and subsequently left intact, an open-ended statute. Id. at 2889-90. He contended that
Second Circuit case law had been thoughtfully developed over several decades, had gained the
“tacit approval of Congress and the Commission,” and thus, ought to be favored by the Court. Id.
at 2890-91. Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia for limiting his search for an indication of
extraterritorial application to statutory text. Id. at 2891 (explaining that “all available evidence
about the meaning” of a provision should be considered to effectuate Congress’ will regarding
extraterritorial application). In any case, Justice Stevens argued that it was not appropriate to
discard the conduct and effects test based on the presumption against extraterritoriality because
the test turns on the presence of sufficient domestic contacts in transnational securities fraud, not
the complete absence of domestic contacts. Id. at 2892 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens found
that the statutory text in § 10(b) and § 30(a) and (b) – which the majority held had no clear
indication of extraterritorial application – offered strong indication that the Act covers at least
some transnational frauds. Id. at 2893-94 n.9. Justice Stevens then stated that the real problem
with the majority’s opinion is that its test for domestic application is based on the belief that
transactions on domestic exchanges, rather than the interests of the public and investors, are the
focus of the Exchange Act. Id. at 2894 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33
18

Overall, Morrison contains three significant holdings: the abrupt
characterization of extraterritoriality as a merits question; the determination that
Section 10(b) does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality (with
the related rejection of the conduct and effects test); and the creation of the
transactional test. Before the impact of these holdings is examined, however, this
article addresses Congress’s response to the limitations pronounced in Morrison.
C.

A Prescription for the Storm – The SEC-DOJ Dodd-Frank
Amendment

One day after the Court released its Morrison decision, Congress enacted
Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act) authorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Exchange Act

(1934)). He pointed out that the transactional test created by the majority would leave an
unsophisticated U.S. retiree who bought shares on a foreign exchange without a Section 10(b)
remedy even if, on the basis of material misrepresentations, the purchase was induced in the
United States by a U.S. subsidiary of the issuer. Id. at 2895. With regard to the facts in Morrison
though, Justice Stevens concluded, “this case has Australia written all over it.” Id. See generally
Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial
Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537 (2011); Elizabeth Cosenza,
Paradise Lost: § 10(b) After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 343 (2011).
19

for actions brought by the SEC and the U.S. government, such as the Department
of Justice (DOJ).59 Specifically, the statute provides:
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. – The district courts of the United States
and the United States courts shall have jurisdiction of an action or
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United
States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this title
involving –
(1)

Conduct within the United States that constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only
foreign investors; or

(2)

Conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States. 60

According to floor comments made by the statute’s sponsor, Representative Paul
Kanjorski,

Section

929P

sought

to

nullify

the

presumption

against

extraterritoriality of the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws with regard
to government-brought actions by codifying the conduct and effects test repudiated
59

§ 929P, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 77v(c), 78aa(b) (2011)).
60

Id.
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by Morrison.61 Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the SEC perform a
study and report to Congress within eighteen months on whether the test set forth
in Section 929P should be extended to private actions.62
Congress therefore wrote a prescription to cure the ills of Morrison in the
government enforcement setting. Whether Congress in fact prescribed the proper
medicine is uncertain. In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that extraterritorial
application was a matter of substantive law, not subject matter jurisdiction.63
Ignoring this rationale, Congress framed Section 929P in terms of jurisdiction.
61

CONG. RECORD, at H5237 (June 30, 2010). Note that other criminal statutes may be invoked

even if a subject transaction occurs abroad. For example, the federal wire fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1343, extends liability to those who use U.S. interstate wires to execute a proscribed
scheme or antifraud to defraud. See Pascquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005).
62

§ 929Y, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871. The SEC request for comment considers

international comity, as well as the economic costs and benefits of including private actions for
transnational securities frauds. Study on Extraterritorial Private Right of Actions, SECS. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/34-63174.pdf (last visited Feb. 16,
2012). The Commission issued its to report to Congress in April 2012. Study on the CrossBorder Scope of the Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, SECS. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-studycross-border-private-rights.pdf (last visited June 20, 2012). See Part V of this article for a
detailed discussion of the report and related public comments.
63

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
21

Thus, it remains to be seen whether Congress’s efforts regarding SEC and DOJ
actions will be effective.64 Section 929P is discussed further in the next section,
which examines the consequences of treating extraterritoriality as a merits question
and the implications of the abrupt departure from the historical treatment of this
subject.
III.

Divergent Waves – Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Merits
Extraterritoriality has traditionally been dealt with as a matter of subject

matter jurisdiction.65 Morrison, however, held that this approach was not
appropriate with regard to Section 10(b). 66 The Court explained that inquiring
about extraterritorial reach is really to ask what conduct is prohibited under Section

64

For a discussion on Section 929P as it relates to Morrison, see Richard Painter, Douglas

Dunham, and Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean:
Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 Minn. J. Int’l L. 1 (2011).
65

See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.22 (1993) (the Sherman Act);

E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247, 258-59 (1991) (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1311-13 (11th Cir. 2009)
(Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d
Cir. 2008) (Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
66

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
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10(b), which goes to the merits of the claim. 67 It stated that subject matter
jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a court’s “power to hear a case.” 68 The
differences between a jurisdictional and a merits challenge are discussed below,
followed by an exploration of the implications of this change beyond Section
10(b).
A.

Assessing the Storm – Consequences of Jurisdictional and MeritBased Characterizations

Classifying an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based can impact when a
challenge may be brought, who resolves the challenge, and the finality of the
resolution.69 For example, a motion based on subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, 70 whereas a challenge based on the merits is forfeited if not

67

Id.

68

Id. One commentator defined the difference as: “Merits ask whether the defendant’s conduct

was legally constrained (by the Constitution or by act of Congress); jurisdiction asks whether a
federal court has the power to enforce that legal constraint on the defendant’s conduct.” Howard
M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 671 (2005).
69

See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (discussing the consequences of

characterizing a requirement as a subject matter jurisdiction issue or a merits-based issue).
70

Id. at 514.
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brought to the court in a timely manner. 71 An instance where this timing may affect
the outcome of a case is where a defendant raises an issue for the first time on
appeal. 72 Such a challenge will likely be rejected as untimely if the court
determines that the issue is based on the merits, rather than that of subject matter
jurisdiction. 73
Additionally, courts have an independent obligation to determine that
subject matter jurisdiction exists but have no such obligation regarding merit
requirements. 74 Thus, a court must inquire into such jurisdictional issues on its own
71

Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009) (stating that a

“claim-processing rule . . . is ordinarily ‘forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to
raise the point’”).
72

See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d 546 U.S. 500 (2006)

(affirming the district court’s decision to vacate a jury verdict for the plaintiff where the
defendant raised an issue of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time after the trial).
73

See, e.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504 (rejecting a challenge based on the merits of a claim

because the defendant had failed to raise the issue prior to the close of trial).
74

Id. at 514; also compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”), with Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(2) (“Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be raised: (A) in any
pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial.”).
In determining that the ERISA requirement that an employer has fifteen or more employees was
a merits rather than jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court noted that the text of ERISA did not
24

accord. Characterization of an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based also influences
whether a judge or a jury will resolve the dispute. 75 Particularly, a judge may
weigh evidence concerning contested facts to resolve a dispute concerning subject
matter jurisdiction, whereas a jury is the trier of contested facts where an element
of the claim is at issue. 76
The finality of a resolution may also depend on characterization of an issue
as jurisdictional or merit-based. A dismissal due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction typically is without prejudice, allowing a plaintiff to bring the claim in
an appropriate court. 77 However, if a claim is dismissed on the merits, the plaintiff

indicate that “Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the employeenumerosity requirement is met.” Id.
75

See id. (referring to Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, 5B Federal Practice & Procedure §

1350, pp. 243-49 (3d ed. 2004)).
76

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.

77

American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1) (2011) (providing an

exception to claim preclusion where “[t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the
case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on
the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts”).
25

would be precluded from arguing for a different outcome elsewhere.78
Furthermore, the court’s characterization of the issue may impact other claims. An
appellate court must dismiss the entire complaint if subject matter jurisdiction is
found lacking.79 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, on the other hand,
allows the court discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant
issues.80
These differences can potentially impact the outcome of litigation. With the
exception of potential claim preclusion, the characterization of an issue as meritbased appears to favor plaintiffs. When an issue is deemed a merits question, there
is a limited time for challenges by defendants, no independent judicial obligation to
ensure that merit requirements are met, and a jury to resolve disputes concerning
contested facts. It should be noted, however, that a pretrial dismissal usually does
not depend on characterization of an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based, as

78

See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“[A] final judgment on the merits of an action

precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised
in that action.”).
79

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (citing J. Moore etal., 15 Moore’s Federal Practice § 106.66[1], pp.

106-88 to 106-89 (3d ed. 2005)).
80

Id. (explaining that this discretion stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
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evidenced in Morrison.81 National Australia raised the issue of extraterritorial
reach of Section 10(b) before trial and therefore had not forfeited a challenge based
on the merits. The Court found it unnecessary to remand the case based on the
Second Circuit’s dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
instead of dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), reasoning that
the new labeling would result in the same outcome. 82
In Morrison, the Supreme Court abruptly overruled decades of history
treating Section 10(b) extraterritoriality as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
The impact of this change on extraterritorial securities litigation under Section
10(b) is monumental. As discussed next, Morrison is already influencing the
characterization of statutory requirements of other federal statutes.
81

See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“Since nothing in the

analysis of the courts below turned on the mistake, a remand would only require a new Rule
12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion.”). See also ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 2011 WL 2623347 (8th Cir. July 6, 2011) (“It is true that an appellate court
may treat a Rule 12(b)(1) issue as a Rule 12(b)(6) issue.”); Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n,
629 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that remand was unnecessary where the district
court incorrectly discussed an ERISA matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than
failure to state a claim).
82

See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358

U.S. 354, 359, 381-84 (1959)).
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B.

Riding the Waves – Implications Beyond Section 10(b)

The jurisdiction provision for the Exchange Act states:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act]
or the rules and regulations thereunder. . . . 83
There is thus no mention of extraterritoriality or any requirements regarding the
scope of Section 10(b) in the foregoing statute. In Morrison, the Court stated that
to establish subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff need only allege a violation of
the Exchange Act.84 Other federal statutes with similarly worded jurisdictional
provisions85 would be expected to yield results identical to Morrison in the future,
that is – characterization of an issue regarding the statute’s scope as a merits
question.

83

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2011).

84

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa in finding that the District Court

had jurisdiction to determine whether Section 10(b) applied to National Australia’s conduct).
85

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2011) (Title VII) (“Each United States district court and

each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.”).
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Prior to Morrison, several circuit courts treated the requirements of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), which limits the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, as a jurisdictional issue. 86 The Seventh
Circuit noted that for six decades prior to enactment of the FTAIA, courts had
treated application of the Sherman Act with regard to foreign markets as a matter
of subject matter jurisdiction and that legislation should “be read to conform with
Supreme Court precedent.”87 Extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, without
regard to the FTAIA, has also been characterized as a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction. 88 Justice Scalia strongly dissented to this characterization in Hartford
Fire Insurance Company v. California, insisting that, “the extraterritorial reach of
the Sherman Act . . . has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a
question of substantive law turning on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act,

86

See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379, F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004); United

Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Den Norske
Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2001). Dissenting in United
Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., Judge Diane Wood argued that the FTAIA language
that the Sherman Act “shall not apply” to certain foreign conduct did not speak to the court’s
power to consider the case. 322 F.3d at 954-55.
87

United Phosphorus Ltd., 322 F.3d at 951.

88

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.22 (1993).
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Congress asserted regulatory power over the challenged conduct.” 89 After
Morrison, Justice Scalia’s approach may well emerge victorious.90
Extraterritoriality is not the first issue to generate confusion over whether a
decision based on jurisdiction or the merits is appropriate. Until the Supreme Court
resolved the issue in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,91 there was a deep circuit split
regarding whether the definition of an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was a jurisdictional or a merits issue.92 The Fifth Circuit in Arbaugh
held that fifteen or more employees were necessary to establish subject matter
jurisdiction of a Title VII claim. 93

The Supreme Court rejected this

characterization and stated that the requirement was a merits question.94

89

Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

90

Indeed, the Third Circuit recently held that the FTAIA is a merits-based limitation, rather than

a jurisdictional one. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 468-69
(3d Cir. 2011) (discussing Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), and
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)).
91

546 U.S. 500 (2006).

92

Wasserman, supra note 68, at 657 n.65 (2005) (listing cases from eight different circuit courts

over the past three decades).
93

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2004).

94

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006). Since the plaintiff moved for dismissal

based on subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal, characterization of the issue as a
30

Additionally, since Morrison, it has been contended that certain requirements
under other statutes, such as ERISA 95 and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 96 should
be characterized as merits questions.
All this is not to say that an issue that goes to the scope of the conduct
covered under the statute can never be a jurisdictional issue. The Supreme Court
has stated that Congress has the power to make a threshold limitation on a statute’s
scope jurisdictional by clearly identifying it as such. 97 To determine whether
Congress has exercised this power, the Court has focused on whether the threshold
appears in the jurisdictional provision of the statute or if it is accompanied by any
jurisdictional language. 98 For example, the amount-in-controversy threshold for

merits question resulted in reinstatement of the jury’s decision against the plaintiff because there
was not a timely motion to dismiss on the merits. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9279 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2006).
95

Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2010) (regarding whether an

employment plan was subject to ERISA).
96

Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2011 WL 2652384 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011); Kiobel v. Royal

Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 272 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011) (Circuit Judge Leval, dissenting).
97

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515.

98

See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584. 597-99 (2009) (analyzing the

conferencing requirement under the Railway Labor Act); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (considering
the employee-numerosity requirement under Title VII).
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diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is an example of a
requirement deemed jurisdictional by Congress. 99 By contrast, in Union Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 100 the Supreme Court held
that a conferencing requirement under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) was not
jurisdictional because it was “not moored” to the section of the RLA establishing
jurisdiction. 101
Had the conduct and effects test not been rejected in Morrison for
substantive reasons, the Dodd-Frank amendment arguably would have been
successful in converting the test into a jurisdictional requirement for cases brought
by the SEC and DOJ. Notably, Section 929P speaks extensively in jurisdictional
language. 102 However, in light of the substantive limitations set forth in Morrison,
it may well be that the amendment futilely attempts to grant jurisdiction beyond the
substantive reach of the Exchange Act.103

99

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-15. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides: “The district courts shall have

original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceed the sum or value
of $75,000 . . . .”
100

130 S. Ct. 584 (2009).

101

Id. at 597-99 (commenting that the two provisions were in separate sections).

102

See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.

103

See, e.g., Painter et al., supra note 64, at 4.
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A similar argument was made with regard to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)104
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.105 The defendant argued that the ATS was “stillborn”
since the jurisdictional grant did not have a corresponding cause of action. 106 The
Supreme Court found that federal common law at the time the ATS was passed in
1789 provided substantive law to support the jurisdictional grant. 107 In its decision,
the Court considered evidence that Congress intended the statute to have
immediate effect upon enactment.108
While Morrison clearly finds substantive law lacking for the conduct and
effect test, courts may draw from Sosa and proceed based on Congress’s intent to
overrule Morrison, taking into account the brief time frame in which Congress had
to respond to Morrison and the lengthy history of courts treating extraterritorial
application as a matter of jurisdiction. Given the uncertainty surrounding Section
929P though, Congress (at least in the government enforcement context) should

104

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). In its entirety, ATS states: “The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id.
105

542 U.S. 692 (2004).

106

Id. at 714.

107

Id. at 724.

108

Id.
33

expand the substantive reach of Section 10(b) to help ensure that the law is
interpreted as Congress intended.109
All in all, a significant impact of the Morrison declaration that Section 10(b)
extraterritoriality is a merits question is with respect to the characterization of the
statutory

requirements

of

other

statutes.

Future

characterization

of

extraterritoriality appears particularly susceptible to the reasoning in Morrison,
though Congress’s ability to make a requirement jurisdictional means that courts
cannot assume that a merits question under one statute is necessarily a merits
question under another statute. As for the future of the Dodd-Frank amendment,
the potential problems seem to lie in the substantive limitations of the Exchange
Act, not with Congress’s jurisdictional characterization of extraterritoriality. The
impact of Morrison’s extraterritoriality analysis on other federal law is examined
next.
IV.

109

Wave Impact – Extraterritoriality with Regard to Other Federal Law

Interestingly, the SEC has not relied on the Dodd-Frank amendment in post-Morrison cases.

See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 2011 WL 2305988 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2011); SEC v. Credit
Bancorp, Ltd., 738 F. Supp. 2d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Since the less strict conduct and effects test
should make it easier for the SEC to bring Section 10(b) actions, perhaps the SEC harbors doubts
about its effectiveness.
34

In Morrison, the Supreme Court stated that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is a canon of construction that applies generally to the legislation
of Congress.110 The Court explained that this presumption rests on the perception
that Congress usually legislates with regard to domestic, rather than foreign,
concerns.111 Thus, unless Congress clearly indicates that a statute has
extraterritorial reach, courts should presume the statute does not apply abroad.112
While Morrison is definitely not the first Supreme Court case to promulgate that
general concept,113 its outcome may unleash a new wave of defendants challenging
the extraterritorial application of federal statutes. To gain an understanding of how
Morrison might impact other federal law, this section examines the Racketeer
Influenced

and

Corrupt

Organization

Act

(RICO),

a

statute

whose

110

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).

111

Id.

112

Id. at 2878.

113

See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) and E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil

Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (both quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949):
“[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”).
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extraterritoriality is unsettled, and the Lanham Act, a statute whose extraterritorial
application was reinforced by Morrison.114
A.

Rogue Wave – RICO

Prior to Morrison, several circuit courts adopted the conduct and effects test
to determine the extraterritorial application of RICO. 115 For example, the Ninth
Circuit, upon finding that RICO is silent as to extraterritorial application, reasoned
114

These two statutes were chosen for discussion because each had case law discussing

extraterritoriality prior to Morrison. Additionally, an analysis of RICO and the Lanham Act
allows for comparison of a statute that likely does not overcome the presumption against
extraterrioriality with one that does. For some of the other statutes whose extraterritoriality has
been examined after Morrison, see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390, 09-56381,
2011 WL 5041927, at *4--5 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2011) (Alien Tort Statute); Tianrui Group Co. Ltd.
v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1328-32 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 11, 2011) (Tariff Act); United
States v. Elie, No. S3 10 CRIM. 0336 LAK, 2012 WL 383403, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2010)
(Internet Gambling Business Act of 1970); and Souryal v. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions,
LLC, No. 1:11CV643, 2012 WL 405048, at *5-7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2012) (Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993).
115

See Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004); Liquidation Com’n of

Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See also Kauthar SDN BHD v.
Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1998) (opting to save determination on the
extraterritorial scope of RICO for another day).
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that the securities laws’ conduct and effects test was useful in determining RICO’s
extraterritorial application. 116 The Eleventh Circuit, after rejecting the assertion
that RICO does not apply extraterritorially without an explicit statement to that
effect, also adopted the conduct and effects test.117 In United States v. Philip
Morris USA Inc., 118 the District of Columbia Circuit applied the effects test in
determining that RICO applied where a British tobacco company was accused of
deceiving U.S. consumers about the risks of smoking cigarettes.119 However,
unlike the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the D.C. Circuit held that regulation of
foreign conduct in such cases did not involve extraterritorial application, as the
United States has a “legitimate interest in protecting its citizens within its
borders.”120 The court stated that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not
apply when a statute meets the effects test; rather, RICO would only have “true”
extraterritorial reach if it were able to reach “foreign conduct that has no conduct
on the United States.” 121
116

Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663.

117

Liquidation Com’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A., 530 F.3d at 1351-52.

118

566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

119

Id. at 1105-06, 1130.

120

Compare id. at 1130, with Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663 and Liquidation Com’n of Banco

Intercontinental, S.A., 530 F.3d at 1351-52.
121

Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d at 1130
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These pre-Morrison analyses likely do not hold up today. In Morrison, the
Supreme Court explained that the conduct and effects test stemmed from courts’
misguided attempts to discern whether Congress would have wanted to apply
Section 10(b) even though the statute was silent as to extraterritorial application.122
Without clear statutory indication that RICO was meant to apply extraterritorially,
there is no reason to think that this test would be any more appropriate in a RICO
case. Indeed, based on Morrison and the presumption against extraterritoriality,
several

courts

have

already

concluded

that

RICO

does

not

apply

extraterritorially. 123 One district court, for example, specifically rejected the
conduct and effects test with regard to RICO “for the same reasons” as in
Morrison.124
The D.C. Circuit’s assertion that the effects test is a test for domestic, rather
than extraterritorial, application is an interesting approach to RICO. While that
122

See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878-81 (2010).

123

See, e.g., Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010); Sorota v.

Sosa, No. 11-80897-CV, 2012 WL 313530, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012); CGC Holdings Co.,
LLC v. Hutchens, No. 11-CV-01012-RBJ-KLM, 2011 WL 5320988, at *14 (D. Colo. Nov. 1,
2011); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 913 (C.D. Cal. 2011); U.S. v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2011).
124

See In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, slip op. at *2 n.5 (W.D. Pa. May

26, 2011).
38

particular test may not survive Morrison, a workable test for domestic application
of RICO involving foreign contacts might yet be developed. In Morrison, by
creating the transactional test, the Supreme Court prescribed the domestic contacts
necessary to establish a Section 10(b) claim.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently had the opportunity to
develop a minimum-domestic-contacts test for RICO claims but declined. In Norex
Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., 125 Norex Petroleum Ltd. (Norex), a
Canadian corporation, alleged that the primarily foreign group of defendants was
involved in a widespread racketeering conspiracy aimed at taking over the Russian
oil industry. 126 Norex claimed that defendants violated RICO by laundering money
and committing other acts in furtherance of this scheme in the United States.127
Defendants argued that Norex had failed to raise a RICO claim since the principal
actions had taken place outside of the United States. 128 The Second Circuit held
125

631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010).

126

Id. at 31. The defendants were primarily foreign actors, though several were U.S. citizens or

conducted business in the United States. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 304 F.
Supp. 2d 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, 304 F.3d 29 (2010).
127

Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F.3d at 31. Specifically, Norex asserted that U.S. and foreign

banking facilities concealed financial transactions to divert revenues on behalf of defendants.
Norex Petroleum Ltd., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
128

Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F.3d at 31.
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that, based on Morrison, RICO did not have extraterritorial application.129 In its
analysis, the court stated that Morrison created a “bright line rule” for determining
a statute’s extraterritorial application: “[A]bsent a clear Congressional expression
of a statute's extraterritorial application, a statute lacks extraterritorial reach.” 130
After noting that Second Circuit precedent held that “RICO is silent as to
any extraterritorial application,” the court rejected each of Norex’s arguments to
the contrary. 131 Particularly, it found that: RICO’s broad language defining
commerce 132 did not indicate extraterritorial application; 133 the extraterritorial
reach of RICO’s predicate acts such as wire fraud did not extend beyond the terms
129

Id. at 33. The separate mail and wire fraud statutes have extraterritorial application, however,

and should be available for criminal cases where a RICO claim is unavailable since RICO does
not apply extraterritorially. Kopel et al., supra note 37, at 398.
130

Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F. 3d at 32 (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130

S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)).
131

631 F. 3d at 33.

132

RICO prohibits the use or investment of racketeering proceeds affecting “interstate or foreign

commerce.” 42 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2011). The statute also prohibits a person from gaining or
maintaining, through racketeering activities, an interest in an enterprise affecting “interstate or
foreign commerce.” Id. § 1962(b).
133

Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F.3d at 33 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882) (“[W]e have

repeatedly held that even statutes that contain broad language in their definitions of commerce do
not apply abroad.”).
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of those provisions to RICO as a whole; 134 and alleging some occurrence of
domestic conduct was not enough to support domestic application of RICO.135
Concluding that the slim domestic contacts alleged by Norex were not enough to
support extraterritorial application of RICO, the court dismissed the claims under
FRCP Rule 12(b)(6). 136 The court declined to discuss what domestic contacts
would have supported RICO application despite the foreign contacts.

134

Id. (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83) (“[W]hile Section 30(b) of the Exchange

Act . . . can be interpreted to apply abroad, ‘the presumption against extraterritoriality operates to
limit that provision to its terms.”).
135

Id. (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884) (“[I]t is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial

application that lacks all conduct with the territory of the United States.”).
136

Id. Before the Morrison decision, the Second Circuit would have also engaged in an inquiry

of whether Congress “would have intended that federal courts should be concerned with specific
international controversies.” See N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir.
1996), overruled by Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010). Though the Second
Circuit never settled on a specific test under this inquiry for the extraterritorial application of
RICO, it indicated that it might have found a variation of the securities laws’ effects test
appropriate. Id. at 1052 (commenting that the effects-oriented approach used in antitrust cases
might be preferred in RICO cases as RICO’s substantive law and damages has similarities with
parts of the Sherman Act).
41

Subsequently, as discussed below, a few district courts have considered this
question. 137
In Morrison, the Supreme Court indicated that any test for domestic
application should reflect the focus of the statute,138 prompting several courts to
perform a statutory analysis of RICO. 139 According to its statutory language, RICO
does not criminalize racketeering activities standing alone – those are criminalized
under other statutes; rather, the statute criminalizes racketeering activities in

137

See, e.g., In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, slip op. at *3 (W.D. Pa.

May 26, 2011); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914-15 (C.D. Cal. 2011);
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 (NGG)(VVP), 2011 WL 843957, at *5-6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (mem. op.); Cedeno v. Intech Group, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 472-73
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
138

See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (examining the Exchange Act to

identify the focus of congressional concern).
139

See, e.g., In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 2011 WL 2112533, slip op. at *3; In re Toyota Motor Corp.,

785 F. Supp. 2d at 914; European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5-6; Cedeno, 733 F. Supp. 2d at
472-73.
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connection with an enterprise. 140 This has led several courts to conclude that the
focus of RICO is on the enterprise. 141
The statute’s purpose, which is stated as “the elimination of the infiltration
of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in
interstate commerce,” 142 supports this conclusion. The reference to interstate
commerce suggests that Congress’s principal concern was focused on the
corruption of domestic enterprises.143 It can be argued that Congress would have
140

18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2011).

141

See, e.g., Sorota v. Sosa, No. 11-80897-CV, 2012 WL 313530, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012);

In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 2011 WL 2112533, slip op. at *3; In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F.
Supp. 2d at 914; European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5; Cedeno, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 473. To
determine the location of the enterprise in a RICO case, some courts have employed the “nerve
center” test, which inquires as to where the decision-makers are. See Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v.
Seamaster Logistics, Inc., No. 11-2861 SC, 2012 WL 1657108, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012);
European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5-6. Not all courts, however, have agreed that the
enterprise is the focus of RICO. See, e.g., CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, No. 11-CV01012-RBJ-KLM, 2011 WL 5320988, at *14 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding that “racketeering
activity” is the focus of RICO).
142

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, S. REP. NO.

91-617, at 76.
143

Additionally, in the prologue of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the Act through

which RICO was enacted, Congress published findings that organized criminal activities in the
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addressed possible conflicts with foreign laws and procedures if RICO had been
intended to apply to corruption abroad.144 Thus, U.S. citizens harmed by a foreign
enterprise may not have recourse under RICO. 145
Undoubtedly, Morrison will continue to be mentioned in discussions of
statutes like RICO whose extraterritoriality is not yet settled.146 A conclusion that a
statute does not have extraterritorial reach is likely not enough to rule on a claim
though, as shown by the creation of the Morrison transactional test for domestic
application of Section 10(b). Next, an analysis of the Lanham Act reveals similar
shortcomings where a statute has been deemed to have extraterritorial reach.
United States weaken the U.S. economy, “seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce,
threaten the domestic security, and undermine general welfare” of the United States and its
citizens. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923, Statement of Findings and Purpose (emphasis
added). In Morrison, the Court referred to the prologue of the Exchange Act as supporting the
importance of the domestic exchange in § 10(b). Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884-85.
144

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (refusing to find that the Exchange Act reaches foreign

exchanges and transactions because Congress would have addressed conflicts with foreign laws
and procedures if the statute were intended to apply abroad)
145

This outcome would not be unlike the potential harsh realities of the § 10(b) transactional test.

See infra notes 192-300 and accompanying text.
146

See, e.g., NewMarket Corp. v. Innospec, Inc., No. 3:10CV503-HEH, 2011 WL 1988073, at

*6-8 (E.D. Va. May 20, 2011) (mem. op.) (discussing the extraterritoriality of the Robinson
Patman Act, an anti-price discrimination statute).
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B.

Surfing the Waves – The Lanham Act

The extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, which covers trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims, was reinforced by Morrison.147 It may
be instructive in predicting the extraterritoriality of other federal laws after
Morrison

to

understand

the

background

supporting

this

finding

of

extraterritoriality. Furthermore, it is worth noting the tests that the federal appellate
courts have developed limiting extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.
In 1952, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction existed in a Lanham Act
case where the alleged trademark infringement was consummated outside the
United States.148 In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 149 Bulova Watch Co. (Bulova), a
New York corporation, sued Steele, a U.S. citizen, for stamping the name
“Bulova” on watches that he assembled and sold in Mexico. The Court stated that
international law did not prevent the United States from “governing the conduct of
its own citizens . . . in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their
nationals are not infringed.” 150 Based on the Lanham Act’s “broad jurisdictional

147

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 n.11.

148

Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281, 285 (1952). In deciding that jurisdiction

existed, the Court did not find it necessary to pass on the merits of the claim. Id. at 283.
149

344 U.S. 280 (1952).

150

Id. at 285.
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grant,” which included “sweeping reach into ‘all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress,’” the Court found legislative intent that the statute’s scope
encompassed Steele’s activities abroad.151 The Court explained that Steele’s
“operations and effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign
nation” – Steele bought some of the watch parts in the United States, and some of
the watches made their way into the United States. 152 Furthermore, the Court noted
that affording Bulova relief would not impugn foreign law, as Mexico’s courts had
nullified Steele’s trademark registration of “Bulova” in Mexico. 153 Significantly, in
Morrison, the Supreme Court cited Steele for the proposition that the Lanham Act
applies extraterritorially. 154

151

Id. at 286-87. The Court remarked, “[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of

international law from governing the conduct of is own citizens upon the high seas or even in
foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed. With
respect to such an exercise of authority there is no question of international law, but solely of the
purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the citizen in relation to his own
government.” Id. at 285 (citing Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)).
152

Id. at 286.

153

Id. at 289.

154

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 n.11 (2010) (rejecting the

reading that Steele merely applied a nonextraterritorial statute based on U.S. conduct).
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Lower courts subsequently created tests to determine when extraterritorial
application was proper under the Lanham Act. 155 As in Morrison, settling the
inquiry into extraterritoriality was not enough. Based on the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Steele, the Second Circuit adopted a three-factor test that asks: (1)
whether the subject defendant is a U.S. citizen; (2) whether such defendant’s
conduct has a substantial effect on U.S. commerce; and (3) whether relief would
create a conflict with foreign law. 156

155

See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 118-19 (1st Cir. 2005); Reebok Intern.,

Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T.
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956).
156

Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., 234 F.2 at 642. In Steele, the Supreme Court noted that the effects of

Steele’s conduct reached the United States but never described the effects as “substantial.” See
Steele, 344 U.S. at 285-87. That language appears to have been derived from the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion in the case. See id. (citing Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1952)).
The Fifth Circuit quoted commentary accompanying the Lanham Act that stated that the statute
covers trademark uses in foreign, territorial, or interstate commerce, as well as uses in intrastate
commerce that have a “substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Bulova Watch Co.
v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1952) (citing Daphne Robert, Commentary on the Lanham
Act, 268-69 (1948)).
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While the Fourth,157 Fifth,158 and Eleventh 159 Circuits have adopted the
Second Circuit test with some variation, the First Circuit adheres to a standard
based on the Supreme Court’s test for extraterritorial application under the antitrust
laws. 160 That court explained that both antitrust and trademark law carry the risk
that, absent some extraterritorial enforcement, violators who have harmed U.S.
commerce may evade legal authority altogether.161 The First Circuit test requires a
lesser showing of effects when the defendant is a U.S. citizen162 and disregards the

157

See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1994)

(requiring significant, rather than substantial, effects).
158

See Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2008); see also

id. at 328 n.9 (suggesting that “some” effects might be sufficient).
159

See Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Intern. (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th

Cir. 2001).
160

McBee, 417 F.3d at 119-20 (allowing the test in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 590 U.S.

764 (1993), to guide its analysis of the proper extraterritorial reach under the Lanham Act).
161

Id. at 119.

162

Id. at 118 (commenting that when the defendant is a U.S. citizen, “the domestic effect of the

international activities may be of lesser importance and a lesser showing of domestic effects may
be all that is needed”). Cf. id. at 120 (“We hold that the Lanham Act grants subject matter
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by foreign defendants only where the conduct has a
substantial effect on United States commerce.”) (emphasis added).
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conflict-of-law inquiry. 163 The Ninth Circuit similarly created a test based on
antitrust law,164 which it recently applied in Love v. Associated Newspapers,
Ltd.,165 making it the first federal appellate court to consider extraterritorial
application of the Lanham Act since Morrison.
In Love, Mike Love, a band member of The Beach Boys, 166 claimed that the
marketing and distribution of a CD in the United Kingdom and Ireland infringed
on his limited exclusive right to use The Beach Boys trademark in live
performances.167 After acknowledging the requirement in Morrison for a “clear
indication of an extraterritorial application,” 168 the Ninth Circuit distinguished the
Lanham Act’s “sweeping language . . . expressly covering all commerce Congress
can regulate” from the Exchange Act’s mere mention of “foreign commerce.”169
The court found it unnecessary to reevaluate its case law concerning the Lanham
163

Id. at 120. The court states that comity considerations should be analyzed as a prudential,

rather than extraterritorial, question. Id. at 121.
164

Reebok Intern., Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992).

165

611 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 2010).

166

The Beach Boys: The Complete Guide, www.beachboys.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).

167

Love v. Assoc. Newpapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 612 (9th Cir. 2010). In a bit of humor, the

court quipped, “Love wishes they could all be California torts.” Id. at 608.
168

Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).

169

See Love, 611 F.3d at 613 n.6.
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Act’s coverage of foreign activities. 170 Accordingly, the court turned to its threefactor test for proper extraterritorial application under that Act, which provides:
(1) [T]he alleged violations must create some effect on American
foreign commerce;
(2) [T]he effect must be sufficiently great to present a cognizable
injury to the plaintiffs under the Lanham Act; and
(3) [T]he interests of and links to American foreign commerce must
be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify
assertion of extraterritorial authority. 171
Applying the test, the court found that “all relevant acts occurred abroad” 172 and
that Love failed to provide evidence of monetary injury in the United States caused
by such acts.173 The CD was conceived and manufactured overseas and was never
sold or distributed in the United States. 174 Therefore, though the Lanham Act was

170

Id.

171

Id. at 612-13. The Court noted that the test originated was originally developed for antitrust

law. Id. at 613.
172

Id. at 613.

173

Id. (refusing to find that Love’s ticket sales in the United States suffered due to the CD since

the alleged confusion would have occurred overseas).
174

Id.
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deemed to have extraterritorial application, the claims in Love were dismissed
based on the Ninth Circuit’s test limiting the extent of that application. 175
A number of observations can be made concerning the courts’ treatment of
the Lanham Act’s extraterritorial application. The Love decision offers a glimpse
of a statute that has been deemed to have extraterritorial application in large part
due to its definition of “commerce.” 176 When the petitioners in Morrison
contended that Section 10(b) applied abroad because “interstate commerce” was
defined to encompass “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . . .
between any foreign country and any state,” the Court responded that it has
repeatedly held that statutes with broad language defining “commerce” do not have
extraterritorial application, even in instances where “foreign commerce” was
expressly included in the definition. 177 Yet, the Lanham Act has been deemed to

175

Id.

176

See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 252-53 (1991) (statutorily overruled by

Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109, 105 Stat. 1077, on other grounds).
177

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882 (2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C.

§78c(a)(17)). For examples of statutes with broad language defining “commerce” not found to
have extraterritorial application, see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252-53
(1991) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (superseded by statute); McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) (National Labor
51

have extraterritorial application based on its invocation of the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution.178 It is not readily apparent what areas of foreign commerce are
covered under the Commerce Clause that would not also be covered by the
Exchange Act’s definition of “commerce,” or any other statute’s similarly-worded
definition of “commerce.” 179 Nonetheless, when considered together, Morrison and
the extraterritorial findings of the Lanham Act suggest that a clear indication of
extraterritorial application will not be found based on a statute’s definition of
“commerce” unless the statute expressly calls upon the full extent of Congress’
power over commerce.
Additionally, the transactional test created in Morrison and the tests created
by the federal circuit courts to determine the scope of the Lanham Act’s

Relations Act); and New York Cent. R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925) (Federal
Employers’ Liability Act).
178

See Love, 611 F.3d at 613 n.6.

179

Compare, e.g., U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 8 , Cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o

regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian
tribes.”), with 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(17) (“The term ‘interstate commerce’ means trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and
any State, or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof. The term also includes
intrastate use of: (A) any facility of a national securities exchange or of a telephone or other
interstate means of communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality.”).
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extraterritorial application indicate that proper application of a particular statute
requires a more in-depth analysis than an inquiry into the statute’s extraterritorial
application. 180 Morrison sets the stage for a two-step analysis asking: (1) Does the
subject statute contain a clear indication of extraterritorial application? And (2)
what is the proper scope of its domestic (or extraterritorial) application? 181 The
second question, from which the Morrison transactional test 182 and the tests
developed by the federal circuit courts for the Lanham Act 183 emerged, really gets
to the heart of the matter – proper application of the statute.
Stating that a statute has extraterritorial application when, in reality, that
application is limited by considerations of U.S. connections may not be

180

With regard to the Lanham Act though, practitioners should keep in mind that the Supreme

Court has yet to hear a case involving the proper scope of extraterritorial application under the
Act and therefore has not endorsed any of the federal appellate court tests.
181

A recent case on the extraterritoriality of RICO actually broke its discussion into two parts

entitled: (1) “Whether RICO Applies Extraterritorially” and (2) “Whether [Defendant] Seeks
Extraterritorial Application.” See Sorota v. Sosa, No. 11-80897-CV, 2012 WL 313530, at *2, *4
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012).
182

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884-86 (inquiring into the proper domestic application of Section

10(b)).
183

Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (laying out the test

for proper extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act).
53

significantly different than stating a statute does not have extraterritorial
application when, in reality, so-called domestic application of the statute allows for
foreign contacts so long as certain U.S. requirements are met. 184 In both instances,
it is the specific degree and type of U.S. contacts necessary to state a claim that
really matter. 185 Thus, the essential question is what are the minimum U.S.
contacts, if any, necessary to state a claim under the applicable statute. The
presumption against extraterritoriality would then only be applied once – in the
court’s statutory analysis when answering this question. 186
184

For instance, despite stating that the Lanham Act has extraterritorial reach, the Second Circuit

looks for U.S. citizenship and effect on U.S. commerce when considering claims under the Act.
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., 234 F.2d at 642. Additionally, the Morrison transactional test allows a
claim under Section 10(b), a statute without extraterritorial reach, so long as the securities
purchase or sale occurs on a domestic exchange or otherwise is a domestic transaction. Morrison,
130 S. Ct. at 2886.
185

This is especially true in a time of globalization where an increasing number of cases involve

both U.S. and foreign contacts. For a different perspective on extraterritorial application, see
United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F. 3d 1095, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2009), which defined
“true” extraterritorial reach as “foreign conduct that has no conduct on the United States.”
186

Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78, 2884 (applying the presumption against

extraterritoriality when determining the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) and again when
determining the domestic activity needed to state a Section 10(b) claim). In response to the
plaintiff’s argument for domestic application of Section 10(b) in Morrison, Justice Scalia stated
54

Though the analysis in Morrison likely ensures that courts will first look to
see if a statute has a clear indication of extraterritorial application, the more
important battleground seems to be the second set of tests outlining proper
application of a statute where both U.S. and foreign contacts are involved. Indeed,
concurring in the judgment in Morrison, Justice Stevens commented, “[t]he real
motor of the Court’s opinion, it seems, is not the presumption against
extraterritoriality but rather the Court’s belief that transactions on domestic
exchanges are ‘the focus of the Exchange Act’ and ‘the objects of [its]
solicitude.” 187
Overall, even though the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a new
canon of statutory construction, Morrison has created a more difficult environment
for plaintiffs to bring claims involving U.S. and foreign contacts. Defendants will
bring more Rule 12(b)(6) challenges regarding extraterritorial application,
asserting that either the statute at issue does not have extraterritorial reach or that
the U.S. contacts are insufficient to state a claim. Indeed, in light of Morrison, use
of the conduct and effects test in other areas of law that are not “textually

that the “presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive, but its application requires
further analysis.” Id. at 2884.
187

Id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
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plausible”188 are susceptible to being overruled. 189 The future will likely be shaped
by courts focusing on the language and objectives of a statute and developing tests
therefrom. 190 An absence of statutory direction regarding conflicts with foreign

188

Id. at 2884 n.9.

189

It should be noted, however, that in determining if a clear indication of extraterritorial

application exists, Morrison still allows courts to consult statutory context in deriving “the most
faithful reading of the text.” Id. at 2883 (stating that a clear statement such as “this law applies
abroad” is not necessary for a statutory finding of extraterritorial reach). For instance, in a postMorrison decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that a clear expression of
congressional intent that a statute apply abroad was needed to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality and that “[s]uch an intention may appear on the face of the statute, but it may
also be ‘inferred from . . . the nature of the harm the statute is designed to prevent,’ from the selfevident ‘international focus of the statute,’ and from the fact that ‘limit[ing] [the statute’s]
prohibitions to acts occurring within the United States would undermine the statute’s
effectiveness.’” United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citations
omitted) (considering whether the Torture Act had extraterritorial application).
190

One commentator concluded that Morrison “giv[es] courts total discretion to discern the

‘focus’ of any given statute.” Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,
97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1044-45 (2011). As evidenced in Morrison, there is room to debate the
focus of the congressional concern of a statute. Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884
(concluding that domestic exchanges and domestic transactions were the primary concern of
Congress, with id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing, rather, that “public
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laws will weigh in favor of a more limiting test.191
In addition to these broader statutory inquiries, Morrison generated specific
concerns under the Exchange Act with respect to the effect of its new transactional
test on Section 10(b) actions. The next section discusses the two prongs of the
Morrison transactional test in detail, as well as the test’s possible expansion in
light of the recently completed Dodd-Frank study on Section 10(b) private rights of
action.
V.

The New Wave – Section 10(b) Transactional Test
After deciding in Morrison that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act did not

have extraterritorial application, 192 the Supreme Court created a test to determine
proper domestic application under the Act where foreign contacts are involved.193
The Morrison transactional test requires either: (1) a purchase or sale of a security
listed on a domestic exchange; or (2) a purchase or sale of a security made in the

interest” and the “interests of investors” were the focus of the Exchange Act). See also Sorota v.
Sosa, No. 11-80897-CV, 2012 WL 313530, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012) (focus of RICO is
“enterprise”) and CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, No. 11-CV-01012-RBJ-KLM, 2011 WL
5320988, at *14 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2011) (focus of RICO is “racketeering activity”).
191

See id. at 2885.

192

Id. at 2883.

193

Id. at 2886 (referring to the adopted test as the “transactional test”).
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United States. 194 While federal courts have already had occasion to interpret the
Morrison transactional test in a variety of settings, 195 there are critical questions
that remain unresolved. The analysis below begins with an examination of the first
prong of the Morrison transactional test.
A.

The First Wave – Purchase or Sale of a Security Listed on a U.S.
Exchange

Under the first prong of the Morrison transactional test, a purchase or sale of
a security listed on a domestic exchange is subject to Section 10(b).196 The inquiry
under this prong focuses on the circumstances in which the listing requirement is

194

Id.

195

See, e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d

1307, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (over-the-counter purchase agreement designating the United
States as the place of closing); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512,
530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stock purchase on a foreign exchange); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12
Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stock
purchase by a U.S. resident); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d
469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (over-the-counter swap agreements).
196

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
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met. 197 In this respect, there are two ways that foreign companies seek to access
capital markets through U.S. exchanges. First, ordinary shares, which are the
foreign equivalent of common stock, may be listed on U.S. exchanges to trade as a
U.S. company’s stock normally would. 198 Second, ordinary shares of a foreign
issuer may be represented on U.S. exchanges through American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs), 199 which are securities that indicate ownership of ordinary shares
but avoid the currency complications of foreign investments. 200
197

See generally Daniel Hemel, Comment, Issuer Choice After Morrison, 28 YALE J. ON REG.

471 (2011) (examining the courts’ early interpretations of the first prong of the transactional
test).
198

For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading directly on NYSE, go to: NYSE Listings

Directory, NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_ny_overview.html (go to “Issue Type”
tab, select “Common Stock” from the Issue Type dropdown, and click on “NYSE-Listed NonU.S. Companies”).
For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading directly on NASDAQ, go to:
NASDAQ INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES, http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/nonUSoutput.asp (click on
“Download non U.S. company list” and then filter for non-ADR issuers). See sources cited
supra note 28.
199

For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading through ADRs on the NYSE, go to:

NYSE Listings Directory, NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_ny_overview.html (go to
“Issue Type” tab, select “ADS Common” from the Issue Type dropdown, and click on “NYSEListed Non-U.S. Companies”).
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After Morrison, plaintiffs have argued that so long as a company’s shares
are listed or represented on a U.S. exchange, a purchase or sale of stock on a
foreign exchange satisfies the first prong of the transactional test.201 Courts have

For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading through ADRs on NASDAQ, go to:
NASDAQ INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES, http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/nonUSoutput.asp (click on
“Download non U.S. company list” and then filter for ADR issuers).
200

See Velli, supra note 28, at S39. SEC requirements differ for each type of ADR, which

include: Level I – unsponsored or sponsored, limited to over-the-counter trading; Level II –
sponsored by the issuing company, listed on U.S. exchange; Level III – sponsored by the issuing
company, listed on U.S. exchange, can conduct a public offering; Rule 144A – sponsored,
limited to private placement with qualified institutional buyers. DR Basics and Benefits, BNY
MELLON DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS,
http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_edu_basics_and_benefits.jsp#l1dr (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
For an in-depth discussion of ADRs and Morrison, see Vincent M. Chiappini, How American
Are American Depositary Receipts? ADRs, Rule 10b-5 Suits, and Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1795 (2011).
201

See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335-36

(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (ordinary shares represented by ADRs on NYSE); In re Alstom SA Secs. Litig.,
741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same); Sglambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d
453, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (ordinary shares directly listed on NYSE).
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consistently rejected this argument, explaining that such an outcome would
undermine Morrison’s focus on domestic exchanges. 202
For instance, in In re Alstom SA, Securities Litigation, 203 class members had
their Section 10(b) action dismissed where their purchases of a French company’s
shares occurred on a foreign stock exchange, despite the fact that the company’s
ADRs traded on the NYSE. 204 The court explained that Morrison was “concerned
202

See, e.g., In re UBS Secs. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2011 WL 4059356, at *4-7

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 53031 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 336; In re Alstom SA,
741 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73. Note, however, that in this situation, plaintiffs may be able to
institute suit under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a). Section
18(a) allows for a private right of action based on a materially false or misleading statement
contained in any document filed with the SEC under the Exchange Act. The statute has strict
reliance and loss causation requirements. Nonetheless, the statute should prove useful for
investors who purchase (or sell) securities on a foreign exchange of a company whose shares
also are listed on a U.S. stock exchange. Such issuers must file Exchange Act reports with the
SEC. See Marc I. Steinberg, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 300-01 (5th ed. 2009); Roger W.
Kirby, Access to United States Courts By Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securities in the
Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 7 HAST. BUS. L.J. 223, 262-63 (2011).
203

741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

204

In re Alstom SA, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 471-72 (concerning ordinary shares purchased on the

Euronext Paris Exchange).
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with the territorial location where the purchase or sale was executed and the
securities exchange laws that governed the transaction.” 205 Similarly, in Sglambo v.
McKenzie,206 where a Canadian company’s shares traded both on the Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the court
summarily dismissed class members who had only purchased or sold common
stock on the TSE. 207 Overall, in determining whether a purchase or sale involves a
security listed on a U.S. exchange, the lower courts uniformly have based their
holdings on the territorial location of the exchange where the transaction at issue
occurred.

205

In re Alstom SA, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank

Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010)). See also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F.
Supp. 2d at 527-34 (dismissing claims based on trades of a French company’s ordinary shares on
the Paris Bourse exchange though shares were listed for non-trading purposes in support of
ADRs on the NYSE).
206

739 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

207

Sglambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). See also In re Celestica

Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 07 CV 312(GBD), 2010 WL 4159587, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010)
(not reported) (disallowing purported class members who purchased Canadian defendant’s
common stock on the TSE, though it also traded directly on the NYSE) rev’d on other grounds,
New Orleans Employees Ret. Sys. v. Celestica, Inc., No. 10-4702-cv, 2011 WL 6823204 (2d Cir.
Dec. 29, 2011).
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This territorial application is consistent with the directives expressed in
Morrison, focusing on “purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”208
Indeed, if the transactional test could be met so long as stock that was purchased or
sold on a foreign exchange had an identical or similar security listed on a U.S.
exchange, one would have expected Morrison’s outcome to be different since
National Australia had ADRs listed on the NYSE. 209
Consistent with Morrison, courts have allowed purchases or sales of ADRs
made on a U.S. exchange to proceed.210 This is not to say all ADR purchases
necessarily are within Section 10(b)’s scope. There has been some disagreement as
to whether a purchase or sale of an ADR that trades over-the-counter satisfies the

208

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010) (emphasis added) (“We

know of no one who thought that the Act was intended to “regulat[e]’ foreign securities
exchanges . . . .”).
209

Id. at 2875-76.

210

See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 530-31 (allowing the

Section 10(b) claim of both U.S. and foreign class members who purchased ADRs listed and
traded on the NYSE to proceed); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., Nos. CV 10-0922 DSF
(AJWx), 2010 WL 3377409, at *1, *3 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (mem. op.) (analyzing Morrison
and then appointing a pension fund as the lead plaintiff because the fund, which had purchased
ADRs, suffered the largest loss).
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Morrison transactional test. 211 The next section, which discusses purchase or sales
in the United States that do not occur on U.S. exchanges, will examine this
situation further.
Overall, the listing of foreign stock directly, or the representation of foreign
stock through ADRs, on a U.S. exchange alone is not enough to warrant Section
10(b) coverage under the Morrison transactional test. To satisfy the listing
requirement of the first prong of the test, courts have required that the transaction
at issue take place on a U.S. exchange. Purchases of ADRs on a domestic
exchange come within Section 10(b) coverage. On the other hand, U.S. investors
who purchase or sell securities outside of this country, whether on a stock
exchange, over-the-counter, or in private transactions, are left without a Section
10(b) claim unless they can show that, pursuant to the second prong of the
transactional test, the purchase or sale was made in the United States. The next
section explores the scope of transactions covered by the second prong.
B.

A More Tumultuous Wave – Purchase or Sale of Any Other
Security in the United States

211

See, e.g., In re Societe Generale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at

*6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (not reported) (noting in support of a Section 10(b) dismissal that
the ADRs of a French company were not traded on a U.S. exchange).
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The second prong of the Morrison transactional test raises a host of
questions. In addressing this prong, the Supreme Court referenced to “purchases or
sales made in the United States” as well as “domestic transactions.”212
Unfortunately, this terminology fails to provide sufficient light on the type of
transactions that qualify under the second prong. Perhaps due to this lack of
guidance, there is already a wealth of case law interpreting this terminology. 213
Many attempts by plaintiffs to satisfy the second prong of the Morrison
transactional test have failed.214 One of the arguments not surprisingly rejected by
the courts is that a purchase of stock on a foreign exchange is a domestic

212

See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884, 2885-86.

213

See, e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d

1307, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss
Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich
Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1.
214

See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-

MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *14 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011); In re Royal Bank of
Scotland Group PLC Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Elliott Assocs. v.
Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Societe
Generale Secs. Litig., 2010 WL 3910286, at *6; Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund,
753 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
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transaction because the purchase was made by a U.S. resident. 215 Clearly, nothing
in Morrison indicates that for Section 10(b) purposes the location of a transaction
turns on a purchaser’s residency or citizenship.216 As one court observed, “[a]
foreign resident can make a purchase within the United States, and a United States
resident can make a purchase outside the United States,” but Section 10(b) only
reaches the former. 217 Indeed, ascertaining the reach of Section 10(b) based on the
U.S. residency (or citizenship) of the complainant would inappropriately revive a
primary component of the abandoned “effects” test. 218 As a consequence, under
Morrison’s transactional test, Section 10(b) does “not extend to foreign securities
trades executed on foreign exchanges even if purchased or sold by American
investors.” 219
215

See, e.g., In re BP P.L.C. Secs. Litig., No. 4:10-MD-2185, 2012 WL 432611, at *16 (S.D.

Tex. Feb. 13, 2011); In re UBS Secs. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2011 WL 4059356, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178;
Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
216

Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178.

217

Id.

218

Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (involving stock purchased on foreign exchange by a U.S.

pension fund).
219

Id. at 625-26 (rejecting the claim of a U.S. retirement fund that had bought Swiss stock on a

Swiss exchange).
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Place of injury has also been rejected as a basis for Section 10(b) coverage
under Morrison. 220 One court commented, “there is no textual or logical basis [in
the Exchange Act] for making injury a sufficient condition for the statute's
application without the existence of a domestic purchase or sale.” 221 After
Morrison, therefore, a U.S. investor injured in the United States from a purchase or
sale transacted abroad is without recourse under Section 10(b).
Next, consistent with Morrison’s rejection of the conduct test, courts have
deemed the place of deceptive conduct irrelevant to the transactional test. 222 For
220

In re UBS Secs. Litig., 2011 WL 4059356, at *8; Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension

Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
221

Id.

222

See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d

533, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the Complaint includes “numerous instances of U.S.based conduct” but fails to allege that a purchase or sale occurred in the United States); SEC v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The shortcoming of all this
U.S.-based conduct is precisely that—it is just conduct.”); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12
Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 179. In Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, the court discussed
how, in Morrison, the Supreme Court: discarded the conduct and effects tests, which valued
whether the harmed investor was American or foreign; did not place importance on the place
where the deceptive conduct began; and referred to E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244 (1991), a case where extraterritorial application was rejected despite some domestic
contacts. Id. at 626 (referring to Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879, 2884-85).
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example, in SEC v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,223 the SEC referenced Goldman
Sachs’ actions in this country in an attempt to state Section 10(b) claims that
involved purchases of notes by a German bank and sales of credit default swaps by
a Netherland bank. The alleged deceptive conduct included transmission of false
and misleading marketing materials and emails. The court dismissed the claims,
explaining that domestic conduct is no longer the test for Section 10(b) liability.224
As Morrison reasons, “Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only
transactions that take place in the United States that involve deceptive conduct
committed ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered.” 225
Likewise, assertions that a transaction ought to be considered a domestic
transaction where the decision to invest was made in the United States have proven
futile. 226 Concluding that an investment decision in the United States to purchase
223

790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

224

Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d at 158-61.

225

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2884 (2010). Of course, Section 10(b) also

prohibits “manipulative” conduct. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Marc
I. Steinberg, SECURITIES REGULATION 414-25 (rev. 5th ed. 2009).
226

See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-

MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011); In re Royal Bank of
Scotland Group PLC Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (U.S. pension and
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stock has “no bearing on where the stock was ultimately purchased,” 227 courts have
rejected this argument.228 One court reasoned that allowing claims just because
“some acts that ultimately resulted in execution of the transaction abroad [took]
place in the United States” would only serve to revive the rejected conduct test. 229
Several plaintiffs have advocated a seemingly more persuasive position that
also has met with failure thus far, contending that purchase orders placed in the
United States for stock listed on a foreign exchange are domestic transactions
under Morrison.230 As one court reasoned, “the Exchange Act was not intended to
retirement funds bought British stock on British and Amsterdam exchanges); Plumbers’ Union
Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178. In In re Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC
Securities Litigation, plaintiffs additionally noted that the decision was based on the advice of
U.S.-based asset managers. 765 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
227

Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (citing plaintiff’s

rejected argument for Section 10(b) coverage in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp.
2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
228

See, e.g., id. at 178; Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 622, 627.
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Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624.

230

See, e.g., Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Stackhouse v.

Toyota Motor Co., Nos. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), etal. , 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
July 16, 2010) (mem. op.). In In re BP P.L.C. Securities Litigation, plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried
to rely on the trading rules of the LSE to establish a domestic transaction. No. 4:10-MD-2185,
2012 WL 432611, at *68-69 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2011). They explained that LSE’s electronic
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regulate foreign exchanges” and that, due to the potential for conflicts with foreign
law, “United States securities laws should defer to the law of the country where the
security is exchanged.” 231 Based on Morrison’s rationale, therefore, it may well be
that transactions effected on foreign exchanges can never be domestic transactions
coming within Section 10(b) coverage.
After having gone through the rejected bases for defining a domestic
transaction – that is, residency or citizenship, location where injury occurred,
location of deceptive conduct, location of investment decision, and location where
the purchase orders were placed – it is time to examine a basis that has yielded
inconsistent responses from the courts. The theory that domestic transactions under
the second prong of Morrison referred to “purchases and sales of securities
explicitly solicited by the issuer within the United States” was first suggested and

trading network could pair a third-party market maker in the United States with a U.S. investor
and argued that this type of transaction takes place in the United States, not in London. Id. at
*68. The court replied, “carving out an exception for the purchase of securities on the LSE
because some acts that ultimately result in the execution of a transaction abroad take place in the
United States would be to reinstate the conduct test.” Id. at *69.
231

Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1. See Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753

F. Supp. 2d at 179 (rejecting a Section 10(b) claim where a U.S. pension fund placed a purchase
order in the United States for Swiss stock on a Swiss exchange)
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adopted in Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., 232 a memorandum opinion designating
a lead plaintiff for a securities class action suit. 233 A decision from the Southern
District of New York subsequently accepted this interpretation of the Morrison
transaction test, 234 but that district has declined to consistently follow it.235 To add
to this division, the District Court for the District of Colorado found Stackhouse’s
interpretation unpersuasive. 236 In Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital
Management Holdings, Ltd., 237 the court pointed out that Morrison did not
attribute any significance to the place of solicitation in reaching its holding. 238
Indeed, it is questionable whether any part of the transactional test relies on
232

Nos. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), et al. , 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010)

(mem. op.) (emphasis added).
233

Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1.

234

See Elliott Assocs. v. Porche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y.

2010).
235

Compare Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (quoting Stackhouse), with SEC v. Goldman

Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 158-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (failing to key in on the alleged
solicitation by Goldman Sachs and instead dismissing two Section 10(b) claims because the SEC
failed to allege that “any party incurred ‘irrevocable liability’ in the United States”).
236

Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-MSK-CBS,

2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding Stackhouse unpersuasive).
237

No. 08-cv-01381-MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011).

238

Cascade Fund, LLP, 2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *6.
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solicitation, as this would rekindle aspects of the conduct test that the Supreme
Court expressly overruled.239
More recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New York has
focused on the notion of “irrevocable liability” rather than solicitation when
considering domestic transactions under Morrison. 240 This treatment stems from an
analysis of case law and the statutory language of the Exchange Act performed by
the court in Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance
Co. 241 There, the court determined that a purchase under the Exchange Act occurs
when the parties incurred “irrevocable liability” to consummate the transaction.242

239

See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010) (overruling Leasco

Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (1972), the case involving
fraudulent inducement from which the conduct test arose). See also id. at 2885 (“[W]e reject the
notion that the Exchange Act reaches conduct in this country affecting exchanges or transactions
abroad . . . .”).
240

See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d

533, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. at 157-58.
241

753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

242

Id.at 177.
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In April 2012, the Second Circuit adopted a similar test for domestic
transactions under Morrison.243 The court stated in Absolute Activist Value Master
Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto 244 that a domestic transaction requires irrevocable liability to
be incurred or title to be transferred within the United States. 245 In discussing
irrevocable liability, the court noted that the definitions of the terms “purchase”
and “sale” in the Exchange Act include any contract for such undertaking. 246 The
court explained that the point at which parties contractually obligate themselves to

243

See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012)

(Discussion, Part C).
244

677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012).

245

Id.

246

Id. (discussing 15 U.S.C § 78c (13)-(14) (2011)). When construing the terms “purchase” and

“sale” under the Exchange Act, courts have asked when the subject party became irrevocably
bound” to buy or sell the securities such that “his rights and obligations became fixed.” Portney
v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1981). See also DiLorenzo v. Murphy, 443 F.3d 224,
229 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that a purchase occurs under the Exchange Act once the purchaser
“fully and irrevocably pa[ys]” for the securities); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir.
1954) (explaining that a person is a purchaser under the Exchange Act when he “incur[s] an
irrevocable liability to take and pay for stock”).
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take and pay for a security or deliver a security can be used to determine the locus
of that securities transaction. 247
The facts needed to satisfy the irrevocable liability analysis for domestic
transactions under Morrison are unresolved, as the post-Morrison cases using the
analysis have either been dismissed for failure to allege sufficient facts 248 or
granted leave to amend the complaint with further facts. 249 In Absolute Activist
Value Master Fund Ltd., the court suggested that facts regarding “the formation of
contracts, the placement of purchase orders, the passing of title, or the exchange of
money” would help to show that the parties became irrevocably bound or that the
title passed in the United States. 250 It is also instructive to make note of one of the
instances where the alleged facts were found lacking.
In SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 251 the SEC alleged that the securities
transaction at issue closed in New York. The court held, however, that there were
247

Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd., 677 F.3d at 60+.

248

See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d

533, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 157-61
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F.
Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
249

See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd., 677 F.3d at 60+.

250

Id.

251

790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
74

no facts alleging that any party incurred irrevocable liability in the United States. 252
It explained that, under Morrison, “the closing, absent ‘a purchase or sale . . . made
in the United States,’ is not determinative.” 253 Thus, it appears that courts will not
presume that parties incurred irrevocable liability at the closing, even though that
may often be the case. 254
Other interpretations of “domestic transactions” under Morrison have
considered the location where the subscription agreements were accepted.255 For
instance, in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.,256 a case brought by foreign
investors against Bernie Madoff’s foreign feeder funds, the plaintiffs argued that

252

Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d at 159-61.

253

Id. at 158-59.

254

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “closing” as when “the

transaction is consummated”).
255

See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt Holdings, Ltd., No . 08-cv-01381-

MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (granting defendant’s
motion to dismiss after concluding that completion of the transaction did not occur until
defendant accepted the subscription agreement in the Cayman Islands); Anwar v. Fairfield
Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (mandating further discovery before
ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff’s transactions were not on foreign
exchanges and where the subscription agreements were allegedly accepted in New York).
256

728 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (a Bernie-Madoff feeder fund case).
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the second prong of the Morrison transactional test was met because, though they
sent their subscription agreements to foreign administrators, a transaction did not
occur until the agreements were accepted in the defendants’ New York offices. 257
With no securities purchases or sales “executed on a foreign exchange,” the court
stated that Anwar entailed a “novel and more complex application of Morrison’s
transactional test.” 258 The court concluded that, given the unique financial interests,
transaction structures, and party relationships involved, more facts were needed to
determine if plaintiffs’ purchases occurred in the United States.259
Considering the location where the subscription agreement was accepted is
consistent with the irrevocable liability analysis. Acceptance of an agreement
presumably forms a contract that makes the parties liable to each other if they fail

257

Id. at 405.

258

Id. The court noted that the securities were “listed . . . [but] not actually traded” on a foreign

exchange. Id.
259

Id. For another case brought by Madoff’s feeder funds with similar results, see In re Optimal

U.S. Litigation, No. 10 Civ. 4095(SAS), 2011 WL 1676067 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011). In that
case, the court denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating that a more fully-developed
factual record was needed to establish “where all of Plaintiffs’ shares were ‘issued,’ where they
wired their subscription payments, what the statement ‘WE BOUGHT FOR YOUR ACCOUNT
IN: NYS’ means, and where their subscription agreements were ‘accepted.’” Id. at *12.
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to pay for or deliver the security as promised. 260 Thus, under this approach, a
plaintiff who pleads facts alleging that a private securities agreement was accepted
in the United States may well satisfy the irrevocable liability analysis for
demonstrating a domestic transaction under Morrison.
Arguably, there are instances where courts have interpreted Morrison too
broadly to exclude certain privately placed securities transactions from Section
10(b) coverage.261

For example, in Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil

Holding SE, 262 the court considered whether there was a substantive distinction
between the placement of a buy order in the United States for a security traded
abroad, which it did not consider a “domestic transaction,” and the execution of a

260

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (“A contract is a promise or set of promises for the

breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way
recognizes as a duty.”).
261

See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2010) (dismissing a Section 10(b) claim where the swap agreement was
executed in the United States but the underlying shares traded on a foreign exchange); In re
Societe Generale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, slip op. at *5-7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (dismissing Section 10(b) claims based on ADRs that were not traded
on a U.S. exchange) .
262

759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (U.S. and foreign hedge funds, which were all managed

from New York, sued foreign companies under the Exchange Act.).
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swap agreement in the United States referencing foreign stock. 263 Plaintiffs argued
that, although the Volkswagon ordinary shares underlying their swap agreements
traded on a German exchange, the agreements qualified as domestic transactions
under Morrison since they were signed in the United States. 264 The court
determined that the economic reality was that the swap agreements were
“essentially ‘transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets,’ and not
‘domestic transactions’ that merit[ed] the protection of [Section] 10(b).”265
Referencing

Morrison,

the

court

relied

on

the

presumption

against

extraterritoriality and that the Exchange Act was not intended to regulate foreign
securities transactions. 266 The court concluded that “transactions in foreign-traded
securities – or swap agreements that reference them – where only the purchaser is
located in the United States” are not covered by Section 10(b). 267
263

Elliot Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 474-76. A security swap agreement is a private contract that

fluctuates in value based on the price of the shares referenced within; it is not traded on any
exchange.
264

Id. at 474.

265

Id. at 476.

266

Id. (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010)).

267

Id. The judge stated, “I am loathe to create a rule that would make foreign issuers with little

relationship to the U.S. subject to suits here simply because a private party in this country
entered into a derivatives contract that references the foreign issuer's stock. Such a holding
78

In a more expansive decision denying Section 10(b) coverage, In re Societe
Generale Securities Litigation, 268 the court held that a transaction involving overthe-counter ADRs was not a domestic transaction under Morrison. 269 The court
reasoned that “[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a ‘predominantly foreign
securities transaction.’” 270 For further support, the court focused on the foreign

would turn Morrison’s presumption against extraterritoriality on its head.” Id. One commentary
expressed concern this approach “would likely deny all purchasers of ADRs a remedy under
Section 10(b).” Christian J. Ward, Esq., & J. Campbell Barket, Esq., Comment, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank: The Impact on Institutional Investors, 27 No. 17 WL J. Corp. Officers
& Dirs. Liability 1 (2012).
For another case that considered the economic reality of the transaction, see Valentini v.
Citigroup, No. 11 Civ. 1355(LBS), 2011 WL 6780915, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2011),
which determined that convertible securities satisfied the second prong of the Morrison
transactional test where the securities were notes that could, under certain circumstances, convert
into domestically-traded stock.
268

In re Societe Generale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 29, 2010).
269

Id. at *6.

270

Id. at *4, *6 (quoting Copeland v. Fortis, 586 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).

However, In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation, the case that Copeland derived this
statement from, does not actually stand for this assertion. See Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506
(citing In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
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defendant’s ADRs that were traded “in a less formal market [than a U.S. exchange]
with lower exposure to U.S.-resident buyers.” 271
Both Elliott Associates and In re Societe Generale unduly expand
Morrison’s scope. Since the second prong of the transactional test asks if “the
purchase or sale is made in the United States,” an execution of a swap agreement
in the United States should satisfy Morrison.272 Likewise, the focus with repect to
over-the-counter ADRs should be on whether the ADR was purchased in the
United States. By focusing instead on the foreign shares underlying these
securities, the familiarity of the market where the ADRs are traded, and the number
of U.S. resident purchasers, the court in In re Societe Generale misapplied the
Morrison transactional test.

Prior to Morrison, the court in In re SCOR Holding merely stated, “Assuming that the purchase
of [ADRs] on the NYSE . . . may be viewed as predominantly foreign securities transactions, it is
not contested here that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising out of such
transactions under the effects test without consideration of the conduct test.” 537 F. Supp. 2d at
562. Thus, since the jurisdiction of the ADRs was uncontested, the court had no occasion to
make a determination that the ADRs actually were predominantly foreign securities.
271

In re Societe Generale Secs. Litig., 2010 WL 3910286, slip op. at *6. Thus, while Section

10(b) evidently covers purchases or sales of ADRs listed on U.S. exchanges, the statute may not
cover ADRs traded over-the-counter.
272

See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010) (transactional test).
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After Morrison, parties may seek by contractual agreement to bring their
transaction within Section 10(b) coverage. Hence, to what extent can parties use
contractual language to satisfy Morrison’s “domestic transactions” prong?

In

Quail Cruises Ship Management Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada,273
for example, a foreign corporation argued that the private purchase of foreign stock
from another foreign corporation constituted a purchase or sale in the United States
under Morrison because the share purchase agreement contained a forum selection
clause providing for U.S. law and designated U.S. law offices as the place of
closing.274 The court dismissed the claim, explaining that “[a]dopting a rule that
permits the intent of parties located abroad and contracting from their home
countries in a wholly off-shore transaction to apply United States securities law is
inconsistent with Morrison.” 275
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the decision.276 The
appellate court observed that the plaintiffs had alleged that the closing “actually

273

732 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010).

274

Id. at 1347, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2010).

275

Id. at 1350.

276

See generally Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645

F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011).
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occurred in the United States.”277 The court then relied on the definition of
“closing” in Black’s Law Dictionary to conclude that the transaction was
consummated at closing. 278 Lastly, the court found that the purchase agreement
confirmed that the sale occurred at this domestic closing because the agreement
stated that the title to the shares did not transfer until closing. 279 This decision
suggests that Section 10(b) coverage may be available for transactions where the
parties bought or sold securities in accordance with contractual language
mandating that the closing occur in the United States and that the title transfer at
closing.
Beyond this perception, Quail Cruises Ship Management Ltd. presents an
interesting contradiction between the Morrison transactional test and the policy
underlying Morrison against interfering with foreign securities regulation. 280 The
277

Id. (emphasis in original).

278

Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (9th ed. 2009)).

279

Id. This comports with the Second Circuit’s decision in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund

Ltd., which considered the location where the title transferred in determining if a domestic
transaction under Morrison had occurred. 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012).
280

See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010). The Court states that it

developed a “clear test” to avoid the interference with foreign securities regulation that
application of § 10(b) abroad would produce. Id. It seems counterintuitive then that a foreigncubed case would satisfy the transactional test.
82

Eleventh Circuit focused on applying the Morrison transactional test as literally
adopted. 281 The district court below, on the other hand, looked to Morrison’s
policy rationale, determining that allowing the Section 10(b) claim in this setting
would undermine congressional intent concerning the regulation of foreign
transactions. 282 By creating a test that ignores U.S. conduct and the U.S.
connections of the parties, Morrison laid the groundwork for essentially foreign
claims such as this to proceed.
Nonetheless, the interpretation of “domestic transactions” that seems to best
comport with Morrison and the Exchange Act is the irrevocable liability analysis.
That analysis takes into account the statutory meaning of the words “purchase” and
“sale” and does not revive aspects of the rejected conduct and effects test, as a
focus on “solicitation” would. Though the facts needed to establish proof of
irrevocable liability in a given situation frequently may not be clear, mutual
281

See Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd., 645 F.3d at 1310-11 (examining the transaction to

determine if the transaction “occurred in the United States” as required under the Morrison
transactional test).
282

See Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 732 F. Supp.

2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that even if the transaction closed in the United States, the
purchase or sale occurred abroad because, under Morrison, it is Congress’s intent, not the
parties’ intent, that is “dispositive of the application of federal securities law to foreign securities
transactions”).
83

acceptance of the agreement’s terms and conditions in the United States should be
important. As for whether parties can invoke U.S. federal securities law based on
contractual language alone, it appears they cannot. They may, however, be able to
opt into Section 10(b) coverage if contractual language provides that the closing
and title transfer occur in the United States and the parties then perform
accordingly. With that possibility looming, it seems that the transactional test may
produce results that Morrison did not foresee.
The last section considers private right of actions after Morrison and
whether the emerging globalization of securities markets calls for action by
Congress.
C.

The Ultimate Wave – Private Right of Actions After Morrison

In response to the study called for in the Dodd-Frank Act, parties ranging
from foreign governments to pension funds to law professors have weighed in on
whether Congress ought to reinstate some form of the conduct and effects test for
private right of actions under Section 10(b). 283 Most foreign governments argue

283

See, e.g., California State Teachers’ Retirement System et al., Comment in Response to SEC

Release No. 34-63174 (Feb. 18, 2011) (group of sixteen pension funds); Jonathan Taylor,
Managing Dir. Fin. Servs. & Stability, U.K., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 3463174 (Feb. 11, 2011) (United Kingdom government); Robert P. Bartlett, III et al., Comment in
Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174 (Feb. 18, 2011) (group of forty-two law professors).
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that expanding Morrison would create conflicts with foreign law. 284 For instance,
unlike the United States, many European countries have not adopted or have
limited class actions, have limited discovery, do not allow contingency fees, and
require the loser to pay litigation costs. 285 Rather, these countries have made
deliberate decisions not to provide the same remedies as are available in the United
States. Additionally, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Switzerland
argue that expansion of Morrison is not necessary because each country has

284

See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 283, at 9 (United Kingdom); Klaus Botzet, Legal Advisor and

Consul General, F.R.G., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 2-3 (Feb. 18,
2011) (Germany); Catherine Bergeal, La Directrice des Affaires Juridiques, Fr., Comment in
Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 2-3 (Feb. 17, 2011) (France). See generally Marc I.
Steinberg, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW (1998).
285

See Taylor, supra note 283, at 2-3 (United Kingdom); Bergeal, supra note 284, at 4 (France).

The comment by France even provided, “French courts would almost certainly refuse to enforce
a court judgment in the U.S. ‘opt out’ class action because such a judgment violates French
constitutional principles and public policy.” Id. at 7. For a detailed comparison of U.S. and
foreign securities law, see the appendix of a comment by several European banking federations.
Mouvement des Entreprises de France et al., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 3463174, app. (Feb. 18, 2011).
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remedies available to U.S. investors who invest in foreign markets. 286 Several of
the governments emphasize cooperation between regulating authorities as an
effective way to deal with transnational securities. 287 Overall, foreign governments
advocate that the Section 10(b) private right of action should remain limited by
Morrison.
U.S. pension funds, on the other hand, advocate that Section 10(b) ought to
extend to all purchases and sales of securities by financial institutions located in
the United States and by individuals and entities who reside in the United States.288
286

Taylor, supra note 283, at 8-9 (United Kingdom); Bergeal, supra note 284, at 6-7 (France);

Botzet, supra note 284, at 2-3 (Germany); Manuel Sager, Ambassador, Switz., Comment in
Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 2 (Feb. 22, 2011) (Switzerland).
287

See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 283, at 7 (United Kingdom); Bergeal, supra note 284, at 8

(France); Sager, supra note 286, at 3 (Switzerland).
288

See California State Teachers’ Retirement System et al., supra note 283, at 1 (sixteen public

pension funds from eleven different states managing $732 billion); Ohio Public Employees
Retirement System et al., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 1-2 (Feb. 18,
2011) (five Ohio public pension funds managing $162 billion); Thomas P. DiNapoli, State
Comptroller, N.Y., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 1 (Feb. 18, 2011)
(trustee of the $141 billion New York State Common Retirement Fund). Cf. Robbins Gellar
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 4 (Feb. 18,
2011) (institutional investors of foreign pension funds worth $134 billion urging Congress to
reinstate the conduct and effects test).
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Five Ohio pension funds assert that U.S. and European Union brokers are required
by legislation to execute purchases and sales on the exchange that, under the
circumstances, most benefits the client. 289 Investors therefore have no idea which
exchange(s) their orders will be directed through.290 Additionally, many states
mandate that state pension funds engage in prudent diversification. 291 For some
funds, this requires the purchase of securities on foreign exchanges.292 Several
289

Ohio Public Employees Retirement System et al., supra note 288, at 7.

290

Id. at 7. See also National Association of Shareholder and Consumer Attorneys, Comment in

Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 21 (Feb. 18, 2011) (noting that the exchange used is
not often under the investor’s control).
291

See Ohio Public Employees Retirement System et al., supra note 288, at 7-8; DiNapoli, supra

note 288, at 2. As of December 31, 2010, about 29% of the New York State Common Retirement
Fund’s public equities were international, with most of them purchased on foreign exchanges. Id.
at 2.
292

See Ohio Public Employees Retirement System et al., supra note 288, at 8 (stating that “an

investor seeking to have automotive industry representation simply cannot avoid buying Toyota
or Volkswagon and cannot buy energy without purchasing BP or Royal Dutch Shell”). As an
example of the potentially negative effects of Morrison, the trustee for the New York State
Common Retirement Fund notes that the fund purchased BP shares on a foreign exchange and,
thus, may not be able to continue its role as lead plaintiff against BP concerning
misrepresentations about the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. DiNapoli, supra note 288, at
2-3. The trustee points out that 40% of BP’s assets and workers are in North America, that 40%
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funds contend that a private right of action for U.S. investors, regardless of where
the affected securities transaction(s) are consummated, is essential to effectuate the
Exchange Act’s primary purpose of protecting investors. 293
A comment by a group of forty-two law professors also supports extending
Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act to private plaintiffs.294 The professors argued
that, with the fluid and international nature of modern financial markets, the place
of a trade is becoming increasingly arbitrary. 295 For instance, they predicted that
the proposed merger of the Deutsche Borse and NYSE Euronext (which
subsequently was scuttled) would result in offshore trades that, in the past, would
have been executed in the United States. 296 Rather than focus on where a trade

of its ordinary shares are owned by U.S. investors, and that BP has two wholly-owned U.S.
subsidiaries. Id. For a further discussion of Morrison’s impact on institutional investors, see
Ward & Barket, supra note 267.
293

See California State Teachers’ Retirement System et al., supra note 283, at 7-8, 14; Ohio

Public Employees Retirement System et al., supra note 288, at 3-5.
294

Bartlett, III et al., supra note 283, at 5.

295

Id. at 7.

296

Id. at 5-6. European officials have since blocked this deal, and the parent company of the

NYSE has decided not to pursue the merger. See Jacob Bunge, NYSE-Deutsche Bὂrse Joins
Dead-Deal List, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2012, at C2; Aaron Smith et al., NYSE-Frankfurt Stock
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occurs, the group urged Congress to focus on where an investor is induced to
trade. 297 Additionally, when foreign issuers list their stock in the United States and
voluntarily subject themselves to U.S. securities laws, as National Australia did in
Morrison by offering ADRs on the NYSE, the group argued that concerns about
international comity are minimized.298 Lastly, the professors pointed to the
numerous dismissals of securities fraud cases since Morrison as evidence of its
shortcomings.299 By comparison, they claimed that the conduct and effects test
Exchange Merger Blocked, CNN MONEY (Feb. 1, 2012),
money.cnn.com/2012/02/01/markets/nyse_euronext_deutsche_boerse/index.htm.
297

Id. at 7 (arguing that “[i]f a person in the U.S. is approached by brokers in the U.S. and is led

to execute a trade on a foreign exchange, surely that trade is territorial, not extraterritorial”). In
urging the Commission to reflect on the benefits of reinstating the conduct and effects test, the
professors suggest that the Commission consider “analogies to Regulation S’s ‘directed selling
efforts’” and “the extent of trading in categories of economically equivalent instruments,” such
as ADRs and swaps backed by foreign shares. Id. at 8.
298

Id. at 8-10. The group of professors remarked that plaintiffs in Morrison did not emphasize

these facts before the Supreme Court. Id. at 13.
299

See id. at 13-18 (describing twelve cases dismissed or pending a motion to dismiss since

Morrison). Many of the professors were also persuaded by the scenario painted by Justice
Stevens in Morrison, where a retiree, after being sold doomed securities in a door-to-door sale by
an executive of a foreign-owned U.S. subsidiary, might be barred from bringing a Section 10(b)
action. Id. at 6.
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“captures the potential complexity of the relationships among investors and
issuers.”300
The Commission issued its report based on the Dodd-Frank study in April
2012. 301 Rather than recommend a particular course of action, the Commission put
forth several alternatives regarding private right of actions for Congressional
consideration.302 These alternatives ranged from extending the conduct and effects
test that Congress granted the Commission and DOJ in the Dodd-Frank Act, 303 to
supplementing and clarifying the second prong of the Morrison transaction test,304
300

Id. at 11. Note that one of the authors of this article, Marc I. Steinberg, joined this comment

letter.
301

See generally Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action Under Section

10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 62.
302

Id. at 58-59.

303

See id. at 60-64. The Commission offered variations on the conduct and effects test for private

rights of actions, such as an additional requirement that “the plaintiff’s injury resulted directly
from conduct within the United States” or that a U.S. investor brought the complaint. Id. at 60
(emphasis in original).
304

See id. at 64-69. Options presented for consideration included:
1. Permit Investors to Pursue a Section 10(b) Private Action for the Purchase or Sale of
any Security that Is of the Same Class of Securities Registered in the United States,
Irrespective of the Actual Location of the Transaction
...
90

to taking no action at all. 305 Issuing a dissenting statement on the report, SEC
Commissioner Luis Aguilar expressed his “strong disappointment,” citing the
report’s lack of any specific recommendations and its failure to accurately portray
the “immense and irreparable investor harm” resulting from Morrison. 306

2. Authorize Section 10(b) Private Actions Against Securities Intermediaries that
Engage in Securities Fraud While Purchasing or Selling Securities Overseas for U.S.
Investors
...
3. Permit Investors to Pursue a Section 10(b) Private Action if They Can Demonstrate
that They Were Induced While in the United States to Engage in the Transaction,
Irrespective of Where the Actual Transaction Occurred
...
4. Clarify that an Off-Exchange Transaction Takes Place in the United States if Either
Party Made the Offer to Sell or Purchase, or Accepted the Offer to Sell or Purchase,
While in the United States
....
Id. at 64-68.
305

See id. at 57-58 (noting that this approach would leave interpretation of Morrison to the

courts).
306

See Luis A. Aguilar, Statement by Commissioner: Defrauded Investors Deserve Their Day in

Court, SECS. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch041112laa.htm (Apr. 11, 2012)
91

In the SEC comments submitted by the various parties, the main
disagreement appears to concern whether Section 10(b) coverage ought to be
available to U.S. investors who purchased or sold securities of foreign issuers. In
that situation, the United States has an interest in protecting U.S. investors, while a
foreign government has an interest in policing issuers within its country. The
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law observes
that, with the increasing globalization of securities markets, territorial factors may
become less relevant. Conversely, the place of representations and negotiations,307
the nationality and residency of the parties, 308 and the effect of the transaction or
conduct on U.S. markets and investors 309 become more important. 310 Clearly, the
locale of a transaction will become increasingly irrelevant if international exchange
mergers become widespread. If the Exchange Act is to adequately protect U.S.
investors and markets in the future, non-territorial factors, such as those set forth in
the Restatement, must play a pivotal role in determining the scope of the Section
307

American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416(2)(b).

308

Id. § 416(2)(c). This factor may be particularly important when seeking to protect members of

the United States armed forces stationed abroad. Id. rptr. n.2.
309

See id. § 416(2)(a) (considering “whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be

expected to have, a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for securities of
the same issuer or on holdings in such securities by United States nationals or residents”).
310

Id. § 416 cmt.a.
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10(b) private right of action. 311 For these reasons, Congress needs to reconsider the
substantive scope of Section 10(b) as applied to transactions consummated abroad.
VI.

Conclusion
Morrison has significant ramifications. Overall, the decision (1) altered the

longstanding treatment of extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional issue; (2) rendered it
more difficult to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality under federal
law; and (3) dramatically narrowed the scope of Section 10(b) with respect to
transnational frauds. The first two changes primarily have affected federal law
outside of U.S. securities law. Statutory requirements are being scrutinized after
Morrison to ensure that they are not incorrectly characterized as jurisdictional
issues. Additionally, Morrison’s strict approach to the presumption against
extraterritoriality is driving discussions where a statute’s extraterritorial reach is
unsettled. It is the creation of the transactional test, however, that will have the
most lasting reverberations on the legal tapestry.

311

Under the Restatement, it would be reasonable for the United States to exercise jurisdiction

based on representations made in the United States and for the protection of a U.S. investor. See
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416(2)(b)-(c), cmt. a. This is not to say that the
application of foreign law would be inappropriate. As in blue sky law, the transaction may have
sufficient connection to both U.S. and foreign law to warrant application of either law. See
Joseph C. Long, 12 BLUE SKY LAW § 4.1 (2010).
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Both securities law and non-securities law have been impacted by the
transactional test, but in very different ways. The focus in securities law will be
gaining an understanding of what it means to have a “domestic transaction” under
Morrison. This may entail development of the irrevocable liability analysis and
possibly some incorporation of contract law concepts. On the whole, with respect
to private rights of action, it can be said that the transactional test sets a much
higher threshold for Section 10(b) claims than the now defunct conduct and effects
test ever did.
As for non-securities law, Morrison can be expected to guide the important
development of the secondary tests that instruct courts as to the proper application
of a statute. RICO is likely the first of many statutes to be examined by courts in
accordance with the process set forth in Morrison. That is, the process of first
identifying the focus of a statute based on its statutory language and legislative
history and then creating a minimum-U.S.-contact test in accordance with that
focus, all the while being mindful of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
With the globalization of finance and business markets, ascertaining the requisite
U.S. nexus under an applicable statute will become increasingly critical in
discerning the boundaries of U.S. law.
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